Originally published in “La Opinión de Zamora”, March 26th, 2023

The Spanish philosopher Fernando Savater often reminded his audience that in a democracy, we are all politicians, although only some are representatives. In my opinion, the book I am about to comment on is the best popular science piece on Politics. In a democracy, since (regardless of their profession) the reader is also a politician, the logic of power is always practical knowledge.

The book is "The Dictator's Handbook" by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, two Political Science professors in New York University. The work falls within the realist tradition that the reader might associate with Machiavelli, that often-misunderstood idealist who witnessed the fall of the Republic of Florence into tyranny and dedicated his entire intellectual work to create tools for the liberation of Italy.

Like Machiavelli, the authors understand that emancipation begins in truth, by removing the veils of idealism and superstition and replacing them not just with realism, but with pessimism about human behavior. Institutions not only have to be built for ordinary men: they must be rogue-proof. Similarly, the citizens should not be protected from reality, or soon they will  become subjects.

Darwin narrated in horror the life cycle of endo-parasitic wasps that lay their eggs in a live prey. Reading the first chapters of this book generates a similar feeling of despair, as it describes the brutal logic of the struggle for power and rent extraction with conviction and without concessions. The authors describe the canonical model of social extraction,  where actors who have accumulated the most power and on whom the sovereign's power is based are permanently rewarded for their loyalty by being granted the right to extract from the masses most of the income that exceeds mere subsistence. Power and corruption appear as two sides of the same coin, and the relationship seems so deep that it is difficult to understand how, in the last two centuries, much of Humanity has managed to escape this powerful dynamic.

The power-extraction feedback loop is not only documented in the worst dictatorships but also in international organizations (FIFA and the International Olympic Committee are sources of examples) and in democracies, where the authors find an equally brutal competition and a political elite adapted to that competition.

The work is based on an academic treatise, where the authors used a database of political events (since antiquity), but the popular version is not only more readable but even more interesting, because the specific cases are well explained, and the overuse of statistics from the academic version has disappeared. Still, the most important results on the duration in office of politicians under different regimes, on transitions between regimes, and on the economic consequences of various political systems are explained in detail in a series of chapters in the central part of the work.

Finally, after facing the abyss of the nature of power and those who wield it, the authors describe the social checks and balances that make the sustainability of pluralistic political regimes possible. That long tradition of "individual vices that become public virtues," which the reader might associate with Adam Smith and the field of economics, appears in the world of democratic politics. Democratic competition turns the natural brutality and cynicism of political actors into a virtuous competition to provide the public with maximum material prosperity.

Of particular importance, especially at this moment when the world is teetering on the edge of the abyss, are the chapters on the Pax Democratica. Both authors are experts in international relations, and the book describes how the political costs of wars are different for autocrats and democracies, and how consolidated democracies tend to form alliances that have a credibility impossible for autocrats, trapped in the same logic of distrust towards their subordinates, their public, and other autocrats.

In short, endo-parasitic wasps and the love of parents for their children are fruits of the same elegant and cruel Nature, and Politics, equally red in tooth and claw, also gives rise to the worst and sometimes to the not-so-bad (if we know how to keep it, as Benjamin Franklin said, with the skepticism of the wise).

Comments2


Sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

Since EA is an organization that promotes prosocial activity outside of politics, it is worth asking whether it would not be more valuable to consider the non-political factors that enable social change. Note that there is a flaw in the Darwinian (and Machiavellian) interpretation of human relations because it presupposes that power relations are not affected by internalized cultural changes over time. How can Marx or Machiavelli explain that the oppressing classes that crushed Spartacus gave in to British workers  unions in the Victorian era?
In fact, Darwin might have been able to explain it with his vision of "group selection."
Let's look beyond politics.

This is a marvelous question, that is partially adressed in the book: "Finally, after facing the abyss of the nature of power and those who wield it, the authors describe the social checks and balances that make the sustainability of pluralistic political regimes possible"[...]"Democratic competition turns the natural brutality and cynicism of political actors into a virtuous competition to provide the public with maximum material prosperity."

 

Regarding cultural change and evolution I wrote a long essay whose cover note you can read here (and if interested, the link to the essay is there):

https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/aCEuvHrqzmBroNQPT/the-evolution-towards-the-blank-slate

There you can see how I see the relation between Gintian "strong reciprocity" and cultural evolution. "But it turns out that existing hominids are more like water molecules (attracted by the powerful van der Waals forces of strong reciprocity) than the quasi-ideal gas helium atoms of abstract philosophy. The moralization of human existence has occurred through the creation of incentive schemes generating social surplus and distributing it in such a way that the social organization itself was reinforced in the process."

Curated and popular this week
LintzA
 ·  · 15m read
 · 
Cross-posted to Lesswrong Introduction Several developments over the past few months should cause you to re-evaluate what you are doing. These include: 1. Updates toward short timelines 2. The Trump presidency 3. The o1 (inference-time compute scaling) paradigm 4. Deepseek 5. Stargate/AI datacenter spending 6. Increased internal deployment 7. Absence of AI x-risk/safety considerations in mainstream AI discourse Taken together, these are enough to render many existing AI governance strategies obsolete (and probably some technical safety strategies too). There's a good chance we're entering crunch time and that should absolutely affect your theory of change and what you plan to work on. In this piece I try to give a quick summary of these developments and think through the broader implications these have for AI safety. At the end of the piece I give some quick initial thoughts on how these developments affect what safety-concerned folks should be prioritizing. These are early days and I expect many of my takes will shift, look forward to discussing in the comments!  Implications of recent developments Updates toward short timelines There’s general agreement that timelines are likely to be far shorter than most expected. Both Sam Altman and Dario Amodei have recently said they expect AGI within the next 3 years. Anecdotally, nearly everyone I know or have heard of who was expecting longer timelines has updated significantly toward short timelines (<5 years). E.g. Ajeya’s median estimate is that 99% of fully-remote jobs will be automatable in roughly 6-8 years, 5+ years earlier than her 2023 estimate. On a quick look, prediction markets seem to have shifted to short timelines (e.g. Metaculus[1] & Manifold appear to have roughly 2030 median timelines to AGI, though haven’t moved dramatically in recent months). We’ve consistently seen performance on benchmarks far exceed what most predicted. Most recently, Epoch was surprised to see OpenAI’s o3 model achi
Dr Kassim
 ·  · 4m read
 · 
Hey everyone, I’ve been going through the EA Introductory Program, and I have to admit some of these ideas make sense, but others leave me with more questions than answers. I’m trying to wrap my head around certain core EA principles, and the more I think about them, the more I wonder: Am I misunderstanding, or are there blind spots in EA’s approach? I’d really love to hear what others think. Maybe you can help me clarify some of my doubts. Or maybe you share the same reservations? Let’s talk. Cause Prioritization. Does It Ignore Political and Social Reality? EA focuses on doing the most good per dollar, which makes sense in theory. But does it hold up when you apply it to real world contexts especially in countries like Uganda? Take malaria prevention. It’s a top EA cause because it’s highly cost effective $5,000 can save a life through bed nets (GiveWell, 2023). But what happens when government corruption or instability disrupts these programs? The Global Fund scandal in Uganda saw $1.6 million in malaria aid mismanaged (Global Fund Audit Report, 2016). If money isn’t reaching the people it’s meant to help, is it really the best use of resources? And what about leadership changes? Policies shift unpredictably here. A national animal welfare initiative I supported lost momentum when political priorities changed. How does EA factor in these uncertainties when prioritizing causes? It feels like EA assumes a stable world where money always achieves the intended impact. But what if that’s not the world we live in? Long termism. A Luxury When the Present Is in Crisis? I get why long termists argue that future people matter. But should we really prioritize them over people suffering today? Long termism tells us that existential risks like AI could wipe out trillions of future lives. But in Uganda, we’re losing lives now—1,500+ die from rabies annually (WHO, 2021), and 41% of children suffer from stunting due to malnutrition (UNICEF, 2022). These are preventable d
Rory Fenton
 ·  · 6m read
 · 
Cross-posted from my blog. Contrary to my carefully crafted brand as a weak nerd, I go to a local CrossFit gym a few times a week. Every year, the gym raises funds for a scholarship for teens from lower-income families to attend their summer camp program. I don’t know how many Crossfit-interested low-income teens there are in my small town, but I’ll guess there are perhaps 2 of them who would benefit from the scholarship. After all, CrossFit is pretty niche, and the town is small. Helping youngsters get swole in the Pacific Northwest is not exactly as cost-effective as preventing malaria in Malawi. But I notice I feel drawn to supporting the scholarship anyway. Every time it pops in my head I think, “My money could fully solve this problem”. The camp only costs a few hundred dollars per kid and if there are just 2 kids who need support, I could give $500 and there would no longer be teenagers in my town who want to go to a CrossFit summer camp but can’t. Thanks to me, the hero, this problem would be entirely solved. 100%. That is not how most nonprofit work feels to me. You are only ever making small dents in important problems I want to work on big problems. Global poverty. Malaria. Everyone not suddenly dying. But if I’m honest, what I really want is to solve those problems. Me, personally, solve them. This is a continued source of frustration and sadness because I absolutely cannot solve those problems. Consider what else my $500 CrossFit scholarship might do: * I want to save lives, and USAID suddenly stops giving $7 billion a year to PEPFAR. So I give $500 to the Rapid Response Fund. My donation solves 0.000001% of the problem and I feel like I have failed. * I want to solve climate change, and getting to net zero will require stopping or removing emissions of 1,500 billion tons of carbon dioxide. I give $500 to a policy nonprofit that reduces emissions, in expectation, by 50 tons. My donation solves 0.000000003% of the problem and I feel like I have f
Recent opportunities in Policy
20
Eva
· · 1m read