I weakly agree with the claim that the offense/defense balance is not a useful way to project the implications of AI. However, I disagree strongly with how the post got there. Considering only cyber-security and per-capita death rate is not a sufficient basis for the claim that there is "little historical evidence for large changes in the O/D balance, even in response to technological revolutions."

There are good examples where technology greatly shifts the nature of war: castles favouring defense, before becoming negated by cannons. The machine gun and barbed wire are typically held as technologies that gave a significant defensive advantage in WWI, and were crucial in the development of trench warfare. Tanks similarly for offense. And so on. One would need to consider and reject these examples (which is certainly plausible, but needs to be actually engaged with).

I don't think the per capita mortality from war is a very useful measure of the O/D balance - it will be driven by many other confounding factors, and as you point out technologies alter the decision calculus of both sides of a conflict. Part of the problem with the O/D theory is a lack of well-defined measures (e.g.). From my impression of the literature, it also appears to fail in empirical predictions (e.g.). Cyber-security is a good example of an arena where O/D theory applies poorly (e.g.).  I think this section does well to support the claim that "shifting O/D balance doesn't dominantly affect the frequency and intensity of war", but it doesn't show that "technologies don't shift the O/D balance". 

So I disagree with the post by thinking that technologies can systematically favour aggressive vs. defensive actions and actors, but agree that this pattern doesn't necessarily result in strong implications about the rate or intensity of large-scale conflict. However, I think there can still be implications for non-state violence, especially when the technology enables an 'asymmetric weapon' - a cheap way to inflict very costly damages or demand costly defence. The prototypical example here being terrorist use of improvised explosives. This is an important channel for worries about future bioweapons.

The main thing is that the clean distinction between attackers and defenders in the theory of the offense-defense balance does not exist in practice. All attackers are also defenders and vice-versa.

I notice that this doesn't seem to apply to the scenario/conversation you started this post with. If a crazy person wants to destroy the world with an AI-created bioweapon, he's not also a defender.

Another scenario I worry about is AIs enabling value lock-in, and then value locked-in AIs/humans/groups would have an offensive advantage in manipulating other people's values (i.e., those who are not willing to value lock-in yet) while not having to be defenders.

Copying a comment from Substack:

If offence and defence both get faster, but all the relative speeds stay the same, I don’t see how that in itself favours offence (we get ICBMs, but the same rocketry + guidance etc tech means missile defence gets faster at the same rate). But ideas like this make sense, e.g. if there are any fixed lags in defence (like humans don’t get much faster at responding but need to be involved in defensive moves) then speed favours offence in that respect.

That is to say there could be a 'faster is different' effect, where in the AI case things might move too chaotically fast — faster than the human-friendly timescales of previous tech — to effectively defend. For instance, your model of cybersecurity might be a kind of cat-and-mouse game, where defenders are always on the back foot looking for exploits, but they patch them with a small (fixed) time lag. The lag might be insignificant historically, until the absolute lag begins to matter. Not sure I buy this though.

A related vague theme is that more powerful tech in some sense ‘turns up the volatility/variance’. And then maybe there’s some ‘risk of ruin’ asymmetry if you could dip below a point that’s irrecoverable, but can’t rise irrecoverably above a point. Going all in on such risky bets can still be good on expected value grounds, while also making it much more likely that you get wiped out, which is the thing at stake.

Also, embarassingly, I realise I don't have a very good sense of how exactly people operationalise the 'offence-defence balance'. One way could be something like 'cost to attacker of doing $1M of damage in equilibrium', or in terms of relative spending like Garfinkel and Dafoe do ("if investments into cybersecurity and into cyberattacks both double, should we expect successful attacks to become more or less feasible"). Or maybe something about the cost-per-attacker spending to hold on to some resource (or cost-per-defender spending to sieze it).

This is important because I don't currently know how to say that some technology is more or less defence-dominant than another, other than in a hand-wavery intuitive way. But in hand-wavey terms it sure seems like bioweapons are more offence-dominant than, say, fighter planes. Because it's already the case that you need to spend a lot of money to prevent most the damage someone could cause with not much money at all.

I see the AI stories — at least the ones I find most compelling — as being kinda openly idiosyncratic and unprecedented. The prior from previous new tech very much points against them, as you show. But the claim is just: yes, but we have stories about why things are different this time ¯\_(ツ)_/¯

Great post.

So if there is some technology which makes invading easier than defending or info-sec easier than hacking, it might not change the balance of power much because each actor needs to do both. If offense and defense are complements instead of substitutes then the balance between them isn’t as important.

This seems reasonable to explain many past data points, but it's not at all reassuring for bioweapons, which is a critical reason to be concerned about offense-defense balance of future technologies, and one where there really is a clear asymmetry. So to the extent that the reasoning for explaining the past is correct, it seems to point to worrying more about AIxBio, rather than be reassured about it,

Forgive me if I'm thick, but isn't this equivalent to saying the elasticities of supply and demand for offense and defense rarely change over time? The price might go up or down, factor markets might change, but ratios remain stable?

This makes sense, but I worry it is not Hayekian enough. People are the ones who respond to price changes; nations are the ones who respond to price changes in the cost of defense, deterrence, and attack. In the long run, there is equilibrium. But in the short run, everyone is making adjustments all the time and the costs fluctuate wildly, as does who has the upper hand. 

The Athenians have the upper hand until Spartans figure out siege warfare, the 11th century nobles of Aragon and Barcelona are consolidated and made more subservient to the King-count Jaume II by his monopoly on trebuchets, the Mongols had logistics advances that gave them a 60 year moat.

The question isn't whether there is equilibrium, but how long until we get there, which equilibrium is it, and what mischief is caused in the meantime. Human action and choices determines the answer to these questions. 

Good post, but I’m not sure I agree with the implications around bioengineered viruses. While I agree we might build defenses that keep overall death rate low, biological and psychological constraints make these defenses pretty unappealing.

You mentioned that while biotech makes it easier for people to develop viruses, it also makes it easier to develop vaccines. But if the ability to create viruses becomes easy for bad actors, we might need to create *hundreds* of different vaccines for the hundreds of new viruses. Even if this works, taking hundreds of vaccines doesn’t sound appealing, and there are immunological constraints on how well broad spectrum vaccines will ever work.

In the face of hundreds of new viruses and the inability to vaccinate against all of them, we’ll need to fall back to isolation or some sort of sterilizing tech like ubiquitous UV. I don’t like isolation, and I don’t like how ubiquitous UV might create weird autoimmune issues or make us especially vulnerable to breakthrough transmissions.

Thanks for this post! I'm not sure cyber is a strong example here. Given how little is known publicly about the extent and character of offensive cyber operations, I don't feel that I'm able to assess the balance of offense and defense very well

Stephen Van Evera ^[1] argues that for purposes of explaining the outbreak of war, what's most important is not what the objective o/d balance is (he thinks it usually favours the defence), but rather what states believe it is. If they believe it favours the offence (as VE and some other scholars argue that they did before World War I), war is more likely.

It seems as if perceptions should matter less in the case of cyberattacks. Whereas a government is unlikely to launch a major war unless it thinks either that it has good prospects of success or that it faces near-certain defeat if it doesn't, the costs of a failed cyberattack are much lower.

1. ^{^}

   (https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-abstract/22/4/5/11594/Offense-Defense-and-the-Causes-of-War)

I would guess a combination of deadlier weapons + advanced in medicine net out. Injuries and disease were more fatal than deaths by swordfighting in medieval times.

Today, your prognosis is very good if you get an infection while deployed. But advanced weapons kill many more in a single attack.

Executive summary: Despite intuitive predictions that major technological advances shift the offense-defense balance, historical data shows remarkable stability even across massive technological change.

Key points:

1. Debates about future AI often hinge on predictions it will advantage offense or defense, but evidence contradicts this.
2. Per-capita deaths from war show no long-term trend from 1400-2013 despite major tech advances.
3. Cybersecurity threats have not radically changed despite exponential growth in computing since the 1970s.
4. Biological attacks have not increased alongside rapid advances and cost reductions in genomics and biotech.
5. Stability may stem from actors needing both offense and defense, making them complements not substitutes.
6. AI will still drive massive change, but likely not via offense-defense imbalance upsets.

This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.