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France could be pioneering scope-sensitive biosecurity policy. Here is why and what we are doing about it.

The Pacing Problem

The pacing problem: science is going very fast and it’s hard for policy to follow. There are several ways to compensate for this, and one is to have more scientists making the bridge between those two worlds. I am a citizen of Europe, and France, as well as a trained biomedical engineer, and I want to use these comparative advantages to make this world a better place.

Scope-Sensitive Biosecurity Policy

A definition

Claude-Haiku gracefully defined "scope-sensitive biosecurity policy" for me (minimally modified):

Scope-sensitive biosecurity policy (SSBP) refers to a policy approach for managing global catastrophic risks and existential risks related to biological technologies and agents. The key principles of SSBP include:

  • Scope-sensitivity: recognizing that the magnitude and likelihood of biological risks can vary significantly depending on the specific agent, technology, or scenario under consideration. Policies should be tailored to the scope and nature of the risk.
  • Comprehensive risk assessment: systematically evaluating the full range of potential biological risks, including naturally occurring pandemics as well as engineered pathogens, but also accidental releases and deliberate misuse of biotechnology.
  • Multilayered defense: implementing a diverse set of preventive, detection, and response measures to build resilience against different types of biological threats, according to the Swiss Cheese Model.
  • Adaptive governance: developing flexible and responsive policy frameworks that can accommodate rapid technological change and evolving risk landscapes in the biological domain.
  • Global coordination: fostering international cooperation and information-sharing to address biological risks that transcend national borders.

The goal of SSBP is to enable more effective and proportionate policy interventions for managing the spectrum of global catastrophic biological risks, drawing on insights from fields like biosafety, biosecurity, public health, and emerging technological forecasting. This approach aims to balance the benefits and risks of advancing biotechnology in a way that enhances global catastrophic risk reduction.

Why France

  • Scope-sensitive biosecurity policy (SSBP) can’t happen in the US only
    • I believe the US is currently the leading force in biosecurity policy, but we can’t achieve the world we want without involving other actors.
      • Some other countries might also have a headstart in the field, like the UK, and maybe Canada
      • See this (US) and this (UK)
    • People should take more advantage of their context knowledge and comparative advantages. (e.g. European citizens not moving to the US because the impact is bigger: maybe personally it isn't?)
  • France is well-placed to be a pioneer in SSBP
    • If biosecurity policy happens in France, it will most likely affect the EU and potentially the rest of the world, as it’s an influential country
      • It's worth noting that defense is a privilege of Member States (MS) and that the EU has limited power on that side of politics.
    • France has a culture of defense and national security, especially compared to other EU MS - acting through that prism can go a longer way (e.g. bioterrorism, bioweapons protection).
      • France has a decent military spending among EU countries and is the only EU nuclear power.
      • I have had confirmation from friends in public administration that approaching a topic with the defense angle usually has a bigger lever.
  • It’s an opportunity to be taken, as it seems few (if not none) are pushing for SSBP in France, within or without the government.
    • If you know otherwise, reach out!

Next Steps

For Us

With @Vincent Niger AE, we are exploring and mapping the landscape of SSBP in France, including public and private endeavors. Our hope is to:

  1. Provide an overview of the initiatives in biosecurity and pandemic preparedness in France.
  2. Guide us in identifying the nodes of influence in that field to understand how one can pave the way for more impactful interventions
    1. Maybe act on that guidance, if it seems impactful - mostly tractable, as scale and neglectedness are already established.

For You

We intend to publish more about this topic (notably, key insights from our research), so if you are interested:

  • Write us! @Vincent Niger AE and @Alix Pham 
    • Help us out, give us feedback, share your knowledge, provide connections, etc.
  • Keep an eye out for more posts on this topic (this might turn into a sequence).

Special thanks to Vincent Niger and Guillaume Vorreux for their feedback, and to so many others that have also helped in shaping those ideas.

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Executive summary: France has the potential to pioneer scope-sensitive biosecurity policy (SSBP), which could significantly impact global efforts to manage catastrophic biological risks.

Key points:

  1. SSBP tailors biosecurity measures to specific risks, employing comprehensive assessment and multilayered defense.
  2. France is well-positioned to lead in SSBP due to its influence in the EU and strong defense culture.
  3. The authors are mapping the SSBP landscape in France to identify key influencers and potential interventions.
  4. The initiative aims to provide an overview of French biosecurity efforts and guide future impactful actions.
  5. Readers are encouraged to contribute feedback, knowledge, and connections to support this research.

 

 

This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.

Thank you very much for taking the time to write this, Alix!

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