It seems to me that many people have intuitions in the direction of "it's extremely hard to know with any confidence anything about the eventual consequences of our actions". The place these intuitions are coming from provides some support for at least two problems for trying to do good in the world:
- (1) Maybe we just have so little idea that even in principle the idea of trying to choose actions aiming at getting good eventual consequences is misguided.
- (2) The massive amounts of uncertainty around consequences mean that doing good is a very hard problem, and that a key part of pursuing it well is finding strategies which are somewhat robust to this uncertainty.
In some sense (2) is a weaker version of the concern (1), and it only looks attractive to address conditional on concern (1) not biting.
What should these be called? I think (1) is almost always called cluelessness, and (2) is sometimes called cluelessness, but it seems like it would be helpful to have distinct terms to refer to them. Also on my perspective (1) is a reasonable thing to worry about but it looks like the concern ultimately doesn't stand up, whereas I think that (2) is perhaps the central problem for the effective altruist project, so I'm particularly interested in having a good name for (2).
One of the challenges is that “absolute cluelessness” is a precise claim: beyond some threshold of impact scale or time, we can never have any ability to predict the overall moral consequences of any action.
By contrast, the practical problem is not as a precise claim, except perhaps as a denial of “absolute cluelessness.”
After thinking about it for a while, I suggest “problem of non-absolute cluelessness.” After all, isn’t it the idea that we are not clueless about the long term future, and therefore that we have a responsibility to predict and shape it for the good, that is the source of the problem? If we were absolutely clueless, then we would not have that responsibility and would not face that problem.
So I might vote for “absolutely clueless” and “non-absolutely clueless” to describe the state of being, and the “problem of absolute cluelessness” and “problem of non-absolute cluelessness” to describe the respective philosophical problems.
“Partial” might work instead of “non-absolute,” but I still favor the latter even though it’s bulkier. I like that “non-absolute” points to a challenge that arises when our predictive powers are nonzero, even if they are very slim indeed. By contrast, “partial” feels more aligned with the everyday problem of reasoning under uncertainty.