A widely-held view says we should avoid locking in consequential decisions before an intelligence explosion — we’ll understand more if we wait, and we’ll have time to reflect on our decisions.

But that view might be missing something: some mutually beneficial deals depend on uncertainty about the future. Once the uncertainty resolves, the window closes on potentially big ex ante gains. We make them early, or never.

The classic example is insurance: while your house hasn’t been struck by lightning, you and your insurer can improve each other’s prospects. But once your house gets struck by lightning, it’s too late to make a deal. You can think of this as a trade between possible outcomes, where the opportunity for trade depends on both outcomes being live possibilities.

I consider three kinds of agreement that fit this pattern, each hinging on a different kind of uncertainty about what comes after an intelligence explosion.

The first is uncertainty about the relative share of resources — who ends up on top without a deal. While major powers like the US and China remain uncertain about who might otherwise achieve a decisive strategic advantage, both should prefer to commit to sharing (some) future power or resources, over the straight gamble. Moreover, the expected surplus from a power-sharing deal shrinks over time, so in theory both sides should prefer to make a deal as soon as it’s possible.

The second is uncertainty about the overall ‘stakes’, like how resource-wealthy society becomes overall. Here, a less risk-averse party can effectively insure a more risk-averse one: taking on more variance in exchange for higher expected resources, and improving both their prospects. Or the stakes in question could be about something more specific, like how philanthropic actors today ‘mission hedge’ by holding positions in specific companies which pay off when their cause is most urgent.

The third kind of agreement involves theoretical and especially normative uncertainty. If one party cares much more about having resources in worlds where, say, a particular moral view turns out to be correct, they can trade for more influence in those worlds. Advanced AI could make such deals feasible by acting as a mutually trusted arbiter for questions that are otherwise hard to resolve.

The basic case for enabling all these agreements is the same basic case for any voluntary commitment: all parties improve their prospects by their own lights, and nobody else is hurt. Moreover, agreements between major powers to share resources could make the future meaningfully more pluralistic and morally diverse, which seems better under moral uncertainty than a more unipolar future. And agreements between individuals could give more influence to those who staked their wealth today on future outcomes as a credible show of their beliefs or values, and were vindicated.

It looks like many of these deals won’t be possible by default. If future resources are distributed rather than auctioned, then most of our future wealth arrives as a windfall, but contracts over future income typically aren’t enforceable under common law. We might instead form agreements over future influence, but that too is legally murky. So some agreements would have to rely on private alternatives to legal contracting, through AI-enabled arbitration and enforcement. We might also consider encouraging commitments from private institutions to honour small-scale deals, or setting up infrastructure for trading on post-AGI outcomes. Zooming out to deals between major powers, we’ll need more developed diplomatic frameworks for resource-sharing treaties, likely involving AI-enabled monitoring and enforcement.

Again, each of these deals has to be made early, or never. And that also makes downsides look fairly scary. Enabling early deals lets people commit to hugely consequential terms before they’re wise enough — especially in a world where you can’t recover wealth through labour income. So if we do proactively enable these agreements, I think we should add in some serious guardrails: requirements for demonstrated understanding, caps on the fraction of future resources that can be staked, and mechanisms for voiding deals that were clearly misconceived at the time.

The dawn of the intelligence explosion may be the last period of shared ignorance about some crucial and long-lasting outcomes. Deals struck under that ignorance tend to distribute resources in ways that reflect mutual benefit rather than bargaining power. Once the veil of ignorance lifts, that changes. The case for enabling at least some early deals — despite the received wisdom against “locking-in” the future where we can help it — is fairly compelling.

You can read the full paper here: Should We Lock in Post-AGI Agreements Under Uncertainty?