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Assuming that interventions have log-normally distributed impact, compromising on interventions for the sake of public perception is not worth it unless it brings in exponentially more people.
This assumes that the only benefit of public perception is that it brings in more people. In many instances, better perceptions could also mean various interventions working better (such as if an intervention depends on societal buy-in).
epistemic status: I saw the best minds of my generation
Limply balancing mile-deep cocktail glasses and clamoring for laughable Thielbucks on the cramped terraces of Berkely,
who invite you to the luring bay, promising to pay for your entire being while elegantly concealing the scarlet light evaporating from their tearducts and nostrils,
who down 3¾ bottles of Huel™ and sprint to their next fellowship or retreat or meetup or workshop, in the pore-showingly lit hallways with whiteboards and whiteboards and whiteboards and whiteboards,
who want to crown random nerds with aureal sigmas fished from the manifold crevaces of self-denying deities,
who write epics of institutionalized autists bent on terraforming these overpopulated hypothetical hells,
pointing out dynamic inconsistency in the comments and melting hectoton steel-marbles around civilizational recipes,
who improve their aim hurling yeeting philosophical tomes at unsuspecting passerbys and ascend urban lampposts to loudly deduce their mechanical liturgies,
who cut down oaks and poppies in the parks to make oil and space for those ones yet to come and who hunker down in fortified coalmines in Montana and the Ruhrgebiet, propelled into the rock by a Ordite
reactor, a Bostromite dynamo,
who exitedly pour & plaster tabulated exponents into webscripted canisters just below the teal-tinded ceiling,
who can name the 11 AI forecasting organisations and the 4 factors of successful nonprofits and the 7 noble ways of becoming more agentic and might even find Rwanda on a map not made in Silicon Valley,
contemplating hemispherectomies to purify their nascent idealism on the verge of a hope-ash London dawn,
who catch a feral heart in the garden behind the A100 rack and save it into a transparent domicile, injecting it with 17000 volts to illuminate all the last battery cages equally,
who empty out their pockets with uncountable glaring utilons onto innocent climate activists, promising to make them happy neutron stars one day,
Microscopically examining the abyssal monstrosities their oracles conjure up out of the lurching empty chaos,
who fever towards silver tendrils bashing open their skulls and eating up their brains and imaginations, losslessly swallowed into that ellipsoid strange matter gut pulsing out there between the holes
epistemic status: Borderline schizopost, not sure I'll be able to elaborate much better on this, but posting anyway, since people always write that one should post on the forum. Feel free to argue against. But: Don't let this be the only thing you read that I've written.
In order to be effective in the world one needs to coordinate
(exchange evidence, enact plans in groups, find shared descriptions
of the world) and interact with hostile entities (people who lie,
people who want to steal your resources, subsystems of otherwise
aligned people who want to do those things, engage in public
relations or zero-sum conflict). Solving those often requires trading
off truth for "power" on the margin, e.g. by nudging members to
"just accept" conclusions for action believed to be a basis for
effective action (since making elaborate arguments common knowledge is costly and agreement converges slowly to ε difference with O(1ε2) bits on evidence-sharing), by misrepresenting beliefs to other actors to make them more favorable towards effective
altruism, or by choosing easy-communicable Schelling categories that minmax utility to the lowest-bounded agents.
On the one side of the Pareto frontier one would have an even more
akrasia-plagued version of the rationality community with excellent
epistemics but which would be universally hated, on the other hand one
would have the attendants of this party.
Members of effective altruism seem not explicitely aware of this tradeoff or tension between truth-seeking and effectiveness/power (maybe for power-related reasons?) or at least don't talk about it, even though it appears to be relevant.
In general, the thinking having come out of Lesswrong in the last couple of years strongly suggests that while (for ideal agents) there's no such tension in individual rationality (because true beliefs are convergently instrumental), this does not hold for groups of humans (and maybe also not for groups of bounded agents in general, although there's some people who believe strong coordination is easy for highly capable bounded agents).
There is also the thing where having more truth leads to more power, for instance by realizing that in some particular case the EMH is false.
Epistemic effort: Four hours of armchair thinking, and two hours of discussion. No literature review, and the equations are intended as pointers rather than anything near conclusive.
Currently, the status quo in information sharing is that a suboptimally large amount of information hazards are likely being shared. In order to decrease infohazard sharing, we have modeled out a potential system for achieving such a goal. As with all issues related to information hazards, we strongly discourage unilateral action. Below you find a rough outline of such a possible system and descriptions of its downsides. We furthermore currently believe that the for the described system, in the domain of biosecurity the disadvantages likely outweigh the advantages (that’s why we called it Bad IDEA), and in the domain of AI capabilities research the advantages outweigh the disadvantages (due to suboptimal sharing norms such as “publishing your infohazard on arXiv”). It’s worth noting that there are potentially many more downside risks that neither author thought of.
Note: We considered using the term sociohazard/outfohazard/exfohazard, but decided against it for reasons of understandability.
We know it’ll be Goodharted, but we can at least try.
Individual payout for a researcher then is
Alternative version punishes actively for looking for infohazards
Argument against longtermism:
Longtermism seems to rely on zero discount rates for the value of future lives. But per moral uncertainty, we probably have a probability distribution over discount rates. This probability distribution is very likely skewed towards having positive discount rates (there are much more plausible reasons why future lives are worth less than current lives, but very few (none?) why they should be more important ceteris paribus).
Therefore, expected discount rate is positive, and longtermism loses some of its bite.
Main inspiration from the chapter on practical implications of moral uncertainty from MacAskill, Bykvist & Ord 2020. I remember them discussing very similar implications, but not this one – why?
If there is a non-trivial possibility that a zero discount rate is correct, then the case with a zero discount rate dominates expected value calculations. See https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/weitzman/files/why_far-distant_future.pdf
You're right. I had been thinking only about the mean on the distribution over discount rates, not the number of affected beings. Thanks :-)
If agents are usually suffering then negative sum games might be good via destructive warfare that removes negentropy, which is one consideration in cooperation-focused agendas for suffering-focused longtermism.