Mechanism design is a field that applies economics and game theory to the design of incentive structures, or mechanisms. Mechanisms are often designed to achieve specific social objectives. Conventionally, mechanism design assumes that players have private information about their preferences and act rationally so as to maximize those preferences.
There are several types of mechanisms:
Mechanisms can be evaluated based on the following criteria:
Mechanism design has been used to improve social outcomes in domains such as medical residency matching, school choice, organ donation, and voting. Mechanisms have also been proposed to improve the provision of public goods.
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Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG). An initiative using techniques from algorithms, optimization, and mechanism design to improve access for marginalized groups.
Wikipedia (2009) National resident matching program, Wikipedia, April 6 (updated 9 May 2021).
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Roth, A. E., T. Sonmez & M. U. Unver (2004) Kidney exchange, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 119, pp. 457–488.
MikkW (2020) The case for promoting/creating public goods markets as a cause area, Effective Altruism Forum, October 24.