I've heard of the concept of "weirdness points" many times before, but after a bit of searching I can't find a definitive post describing the concept, so I've decided to make one. As a disclaimer, I don't think the evidence backing this post is all that strong and I am skeptical, but I do think it's strong enough to be worth considering, and I'm probably going to make some minor life changes based on it.
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Chances are that if you're reading this post, you're probably a bit weird in some way.
No offense, of course. In fact, I actually mean it as a compliment. Weirdness is incredibly important. If people weren't willing to deviate from society and hold weird beliefs, we wouldn't have had the important social movements that ended slavery and pushed back against racism, that created democracy, that expanded social roles for women, and that made the world a better place in numerous other ways.
Many things we take for granted now as why our current society as great were once... weird.
Joseph Overton theorized that policy develops through six stages: unthinkable, then radical, then acceptable, then sensible, then popular, then actual policy. We could see this happen with many policies -- currently same-sex marriage is making its way from popular to actual policy, but not to long ago it was merely acceptable, and not too long before that it was pretty radical.
Some good ideas are currently in the radical range. Effective altruism itself is such a collection of beliefs typical people would consider pretty radical. Many people think donating 3% of their income is a lot, let alone the 10% demand that Giving What We Can places, or the 50%+ that some people in the community do.
And that's not all. Others would suggest that everyone become vegetarian, advocating for open borders and/or universal basic income, the abolishment of gendered language, having more resources into mitigating existential risk, focusing on research into Friendly AI, cryonics and curing death, etc.
While many of these ideas might make the world a better place if made into policy, all of these ideas are pretty weird.
Weirdness, of course, is a drawback. People take weird opinions less seriously.
The absurdity heuristic is a real bias that people -- even you -- have. If an idea sounds weird to you, you're less likely to try and believe it, even if there's overwhelming evidence. And social proof matters -- if less people believe something, people will be less likely to believe it. Lastly, don't forget the halo effect -- if one part of you seems weird, the rest of you will seem weird too!
(Update: apparently this concept is, itself, already known to social psychology as idiosyncrasy credits. Thanks, Mr. Commenter!)
...But we can use this knowledge to our advantage. The halo effect can work in reverse -- if we're normal in many ways, our weird beliefs will seem more normal too. If we have a notion of weirdness as a kind of currency that we have a limited supply of, we can spend it wisely, without looking like a crank.
All of this leads to the following actionable principles:
Recognize you only have a few "weirdness points" to spend. Trying to convince all your friends to donate 50% of their income to MIRI, become a vegan, get a cryonics plan, and demand open borders will be met with a lot of resistance. But -- I hypothesize -- that if you pick one of these ideas and push it, you'll have a lot more success.
Spend your weirdness points effectively. Perhaps it's really important that people advocate for open borders. But, perhaps, getting people to donate to developing world health would overall do more good. In that case, I'd focus on moving donations to the developing world and leave open borders alone, even though it is really important. You should triage your weirdness effectively the same way you would triage your donations.
Clean up and look good. Lookism is a problem in society, and I wish people could look "weird" and still be socially acceptable. But if you're a guy wearing a dress in public, or some punk rocker vegan advocate, recognize that you're spending your weirdness points fighting lookism, which means less weirdness points to spend promoting veganism or something else.
Advocate for more "normal" policies that are almost as good. Of course, allocating your "weirdness points" on a few issues doesn't mean you have to stop advocating for other important issues -- just consider being less weird about it. Perhaps universal basic income truly would be a very effective policy to help the poor in the United States. But reforming the earned income tax credit and relaxing zoning laws would also both do a lot to help the poor in the US, and such suggestions aren't weird.
Use the foot-in-door technique and the door-in-face technique. The foot-in-door technique involves starting with a small ask and gradually building up the ask, such as suggesting people donate a little bit effectively, and then gradually get them to take the Giving What We Can Pledge. The door-in-face technique involves making a big ask (e.g., join Giving What We Can) and then substituting it for a smaller ask, like the Life You Can Save pledge or Try Out Giving.
Reconsider effective altruism's clustering of beliefs. Right now, effective altruism is associated strongly with donating a lot of money and donating effectively, less strongly with impact in career choice, veganism, and existential risk. Of course, I'm not saying that we should drop some of these memes completely. But maybe EA should disconnect a bit more and compartmentalize -- for example, leaving AI risk to MIRI, for example, and not talk about it much, say, on 80,000 Hours. And maybe instead of asking people to both give more AND give more effectively, we could focus more exclusively on asking people to donate what they already do more effectively.
Evaluate the above with more research. While I think the evidence base behind this is decent, it's not great and I haven't spent that much time developing it. I think we should look into this more with a review of the relevant literature and some careful, targeted, market research on the individual beliefs within effective altruism (how weird are they?) and how they should be connected or left disconnected. Maybe this has already been done some?
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Also discussed on LessWrong and on the EA Facebook group.
I think this is a good post for starting conversation but it has also received a lot of substantial criticism here and on LessWrong. To sum up my favourites:
I think each of these is a substantial objection to the thesis of the article and taken together they are pretty damaging.
I think that they can be tied together to be even stronger though.
If you're trying to spread a radical intellectual idea, in the beginning, you mostly want to target early adopters who have a lot of pulling power. Think of the Einstein-Russell manifesto against nuclear proliferation, which preceded the antinuclear movement by a couple of decades, or of many other social movements whose intellectual forebears who preceded them. So far, the most valuable contributors to ideas relating to effective altruism are people like Martin Rees, Jaan Tallin, James Martin, Elon Musk. To a substantial extent, they appraise ideas based on their content, rather than on the basis of who is presenting them. As publisher John Brockman puts it, "I'm not interested in the average person. Most people have never had an idea and wouldn't recognize one if did." Or, as Peter Thiel says: "What is something you believe that nearly no one agrees with you on?" For these people, holding some unorthodox ideas is a prerequisite for them to listen to you. So for people who are promoting a radical idea to others who are themselves radical thinkers, trying to be normal is just not going to cut ice.
Not everyone has to be Will MacAskill or Peter Singer. These two are writing popular books about effective altruism and do lots of TV interviews about these things. They practice talking to the masses so that others can focus on industrial and intellectual leaders, and yet others can focus on researching which charities are the most effective. The problem with this post is that it does not apply to others' roles the same as it applies to MacAskill's and Singer's. But rather, the whole spectrum of jobs are important. Arguably, MacAskill and Singer's roles are less important, because if we can't attract the general public, then we can go to high-net worth individuals. However, if we can't figure out which charities are the most effective, then recruiting is no use at all.
So even if we convince ourselves that it's more important to do fundamental research and talking to intellectual leaders while avoiding public discourse, it's very hard to stave off our human need for social approval. The bottom line, though, is that people don't need a post to tell them to be more aware of social rejection. Most people couldn't forget about social rejection if they tried. In fact, some of the people who gain the most confidence and passion in making a big change to the world do so because they realise that society's big problems are not going to be fixed by themselves. Take Nate Soares for one reasonably articulate example. This can be because of a realisation that society is pretty selfish or crazy a lot of the time, and so some people are going to have to take on the responsibility of improving it. Instead, trying to get across the idea that society is weird might be a better approach to breeding people with a sense of heroic responsibility for fixing it.
So altogether, although I agree with the post broadly - that it's valuable to be familiar and normal, I think people already behave as though it is. Instead, we should pay more attention to the fact that effective altruism is quite a radical idea, that it already has some people who are focussed on acting as its public face, and that it might be better for people to focus on feeling responsible for improving the world, or for figuring out how, before becoming so alert to social considerations.
I think all those points are correct, but I view them more as expanding nuances rather than direct counterarguments. That is, one can re-construct a version of my thesis that remains agreeable -- it would just be restricted to the domain of advocacy (which I did intend but failed to state) and would admit nuanced ways in which such points can be "earned" in addition to being spent.
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