[note that I have a COI here]
Hmm, I guess I've been thinking that the choice is between (A) "the AI is trying to do what a human wants it to try to do" vs (B) "the AI is trying to do something kinda weirdly and vaguely related to what a human wants it to try to do". I don't think (C) "the AI is trying to do something totally random" is really on the table as a likely option, even if the AGI safety/alignment community didn't exist at all.
That's because everybody wants the AI to do the thing they want it to do, not just long-term AGI risk people. And I think there are really obvious things that anyone would immediately think to try, and these really obvious techniques would be good enough to get us from (C) to (B) but not good enough to get us to (A).
[Warning: This claim is somewhat specific to a particular type of AGI architecture that I work on and consider most likely—see e.g. here. Other people have different types of AGIs in mind and would disagree. In particular, in the "deceptive mesa-optimizer" failure mode (which relates to a different AGI architecture than mine) we would plausibly expect failures to have random goals like "I want my field-of-view to be all white", even after reasonable effort to avoid that. So maybe people working in other areas would have different answers, I dunno.]
I agree that it's at least superficially plausible that (C) might be better than (B) from an s-risk perspective. But if (C) is off the table and the choice is between (A) and (B), I think (A) is preferable for both s-risks and x-risks.
Related: https://arbital.com/p/hyperexistential_separation/
FWIW I basically agree with Arbital here.
So this make AI research on (cooperative) inverse reinforcement learning and more generally value learning risky, by making it more likely our worst case outcomes (worse than extinction) will be represented and optimized for, right?
Yep! Though of course the situation is complicated and there are many factors etc. etc.