By Tom Reed and Nick Stockton
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What would it take for Beijing to take AI risk seriously, and what could a US–China deal on AI realistically look like?
Julian Gewirtz, historian and former senior director for China and Taiwan affairs at the National Security Council under President Biden, argues that any answer has to “start with the reality of what China is and what the Chinese Communist Party cares about.”
The Party’s top concern is regime security, so when Chinese discourse warns of “extreme loss-of-control risks,” it means losing political control as well as losing control of AI systems. In Julian’s view, what is most likely to shift Beijing’s approach to AI safety is China’s “own domestic sense of the risks.” Next is seeing the US regulate AI at home: a “costly signal” that Washington takes the risks seriously.
The US looms large in that calculus. Julian says Anthropic’s Claude Mythos has been the most significant event shaping Beijing’s thinking on AI risk over the past year or so, sharpening its longstanding concern about American cyber capabilities.
On a deal itself, Julian is a realist. Designing an ideal agreement in the abstract is where “the impossibility confronts you at every turn.” He would rather start where “self-interest can lead to action in parallel” — such as neither country wanting to lose control of AI systems — and build incrementally from there.
He is also candid about how little outsiders can see. Many Chinese AI companies are AGI-pilled; the government has been “much less oriented that way,” though Julian thinks “even that is changing.” He expects the clearest evidence of a shift to be material rather than rhetorical, such as centralising compute or buying more of the Nvidia chips Beijing has so far rationed.
Julian and host Tom Reed also discuss why terminology would be an early sticking point in US–China AI talks, whether China would disclose its own Hugging Face incident, whether Beijing is reconsidering open-weight models, which Chinese thinkers are worth reading even when you disagree with them, and how to judge China expertise.
This episode was recorded on October 2, 2026.
Julian Gewirtz, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs who served as senior director for China and Taiwan affairs on President Biden’s National Security Council, argues that the most important thing that could change Beijing’s approach to AI safety is China’s own domestic sense of the risks.
Regime security, which Beijing calls political security and social stability, is the Chinese Communist Party’s top concern, Julian argues. When Chinese discourse warns of extreme loss-of-control risks, it means losing political control linked to AI, not only losing human control over AI systems. A very close second, on his reading, is the US dimension: Anthropic’s Claude Mythos has been the most significant event shaping Beijing’s thinking on AI risk over the past year or so, sharpening its fear of American cyber capabilities.
Public disclosure would be very unlikely, according to Julian. Beijing would treat a Chinese equivalent of the OpenAI Hugging Face incident as a cybersecurity incident first, and at every layer of the system the incentives run against disclosure. Though Julian is cynical about American companies too, he says some of them have disclosed incidents: a very low bar, but one Chinese companies have not cleared.
This summary was drafted with AI from the episode transcript and reviewed by the 80,000 Hours team.
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