I'm currently facing a career choice between a role working on AI safety directly and a role at 80,000 Hours. I don't want to go into the details too much publicly, but one really key component is how to think about the basic leverage argument in favour of 80k. This is the claim that's like: well, in fact I heard about the AIS job from 80k. If I ensure even two (additional) people hear about AIS jobs by working at 80k, isn't it possible going to 80k could be even better for AIS than doing the job could be?
In that form, the argument is naive and implausible. But I don't think I know what the "sophisticated" argument that replaces it is. Here are some thoughts:
- Working in AIS also promotes growth of AIS. It would be a mistake to only consider the second-order effects of a job when you're forced to by the lack of first-order effects.
- OK, but focusing on org growth fulltime seems surely better for org growth than having it be a side effect of the main thing you're doing.
- One way to think about this is to compare two strategies of improving talent at a target org, between "try to find people to move them into roles in the org, as part of cultivating a whole overall talent pipeline into the org and related orgs", and "put all of your fulltime effort into having a single person, i.e. you, do a job at the org". It seems pretty easy to imagine that the former would be a better strategy?
- I think this is the same intuition that makes pyramid schemes seem appealing (something like: surely I can recruit at least 2 people into the scheme, and surely they can recruit more people, and surely the norm is actually that you recruit a tonne of people" and it's really only by looking at the mathematics of the population as a whole you can see that it can't possibly work, and that actually it's necessarily the case that most people in the scheme will recruit exactly zero people ever.
- Maybe a pyramid scheme is the extreme of "what if literally everyone in EA worked at 80k", and serves as a reducto ad absurdum for always going into meta, but doesn't tell you precisely when to stop going meta. It could simultaneously be the case that pyramid schemes stop far too late, but everyone else stops significantly too early.
- I think this is the same intuition that makes pyramid schemes seem appealing (something like: surely I can recruit at least 2 people into the scheme, and surely they can recruit more people, and surely the norm is actually that you recruit a tonne of people" and it's really only by looking at the mathematics of the population as a whole you can see that it can't possibly work, and that actually it's necessarily the case that most people in the scheme will recruit exactly zero people ever.
- OK, so perhaps the thing to do is try to figure out what the bottleneck is in recruitment, and try to figure out when it would flip from "not enough people are working on recruitment" to "there isn't more work to do in recruitment", e.g. because you've already reached most of the interested population, and the people you've already reached don't need more support, or in practice giving them more support doesn't improve outcomes.
- OK, so when recruiting stops working, stop doing it (hardly a shocking revelation). But even that seems much more recruiting-heavy in implication than the norm. Surely you don't only stop when recruiting is useless, but when it is not as useful as your alternative.
- In a lot of for-profit organisations, you need to stop recruiting because you need to start making money to pay the recruiters and the people they recruit. Even if it is worth more than it would cost to continue recruiting, you can't pay for it, so you have to do some object-level stuff, to prove to people that you deserve the confidence to continue to do the recruiting.
- It's natural to think that if you could have arbitrary lines of credit, you'd want to do lots more recruitment up front, and this would eventually pay off. But there are people out there with money to lend, and they systematically don't want to lend it to you. Are they irrational, or are you over-optimistic?
- It seems like the conclusion is forcing you to do object-level stuff is actually rational, because lots of people with optimistic projections of how much recruitment will help you are just wrong, and we need to find that out before burning too much money on recruiting. This discipline is enforced by the funding structure of for-profit firms.
- The efficient market hypothesis as-applied here suggests that systematically demanding less or more object-level work from firms won't allow you to do better than the status quo, so the existing overall level of skepticism is correct-ish. But non-profit "recruiting" is wildly different in many ways, so I don't know how much we should feel tethered to what works in the for-profit world.
- The overall principle that we need people doing object-level work in EA in order to believe that meta-level work is worth doing seems correct. In the for-profit world the balance is struck basically by your equity holders or creditors seeking assurance from you that your growth will lead to more revenue in the future. In the non-profit world I suppose your funders can provide the same accountability. In both cases the people with money are not wizards and are not magically better at finding the truth than you are, though at least in the for-profit world if they repeatedly make bad calls then they run out of money to make new bad calls with (while if they make good calls they get more money to make more / bigger calls with), so that acts as something of a filter. But being under budget discipline only makes it more important that you figure out whether to grow or execute; it doesn't really make you better at figuring it out.
- I suppose the complement to the naive thing I said before is "80k needs a compelling reason to recruit people to EA, and needs EA to be compelling to the people to recruit to it as well; by doing an excellent job at some object-level work, you can grow the value of 80k recruiting, both by making it easier to do and by making the outcome a more valuable outcome. Perhaps this might be even better for recruiting than doing recruiting."
- This feels less intuitively compelling, but it's useful to notice that it exists at all.
This take is increasingly non-quick, so I think I'm going to post it and meditate on it somewhat and then think about whether to write more or edit this one.
AI Safety Needs To Get Serious About Chinese Political Culture
I worry that Leopold Aschenbrenner's "China will use AI to install a global dystopia" take is based on crudely analogising the CCP to the USSR, or perhaps even to American cultural imperialism / expansionism, and isn't based on an even superficially informed analysis of either how China is currently actually thinking about AI, or what China's long term political goals or values are.
I'm no more of an expert myself, but my impression is that China is much more interested in its own national security interests and its own ideological notions of the ethnic Chinese people and Chinese territory, so that beyond e.g. Taiwan there isn't an interest in global domination except to the extent that it prevents them being threatened by other expansionist powers.
This or a number of other heuristics / judgements / perspectives could change substantially how we think about whether China would race for AGI, and/or be receptive to an argument that AGI development is dangerous and should be suppressed. China clearly has a lot to gain from harnessing AGI, but they have a lot to lose too, just like the West.
Currently, this is a pretty superficial impression of mine, so I don't think it would be fair to write an article yet. I need to do my homework first:
Alternatively, as always, I'd be really happy for someone who's already done the homework to write about this, particularly anyone specifically with expertise in Chinese political culture or international relations. Even if I write the article, all it'll really be able to be is an appeal to listen to experts in the field, or for one or more of those experts to step forward and give us some principles to spread in how to think clearly and accurately about this topic.
I think having even like, undergrad-level textbook mainstream summaries of China's political mission and beliefs posted on the Forum could end up being really valuable if it puts those ideas more in the cultural and intellectual background of AI safety people in general.
This seems like a really crucial question that inevitably takes a central role in our overall strategy, and Leopold's take isn't the only one I'm worried about. I think people are already pushing national security concerns about China to the US Government in an effort to push e.g. stronger cybersecurity controls or export controls on AI. I think that's a noble end but if the China angle becomes inappropriately charged we're really risking causing more harm than good.
(For the avoidance of doubt, I think the Chinese government is inhumane, and that all undemocratic governments are fundamentally illegitimate. I think exporting democracy and freedom to the world is a good thing, so I'm not against cultural expansionism per se. Nevertheless, assuming China wants to do it when they don't could be a really serious mistake.)
I recommend the China sections of this recent CNAS report as a starting point for discussion (it's definitely from a relatively hawkish perspective, and I don't think of myself as having enough expertise to endorse it, but I did move in this direction after reading).
From the executive summary:
From the "Deficient Safety Cultures" section:
From "Further Considerations"
Also, unless one understands the Chinese situation, one should avoid moves that risk escalating a race, like making loud and confident predictions that a race is the only way.
I think it's better for people to openly express their models that they see a race as the only option. I think it's the kind of thing that can then lead to arguments and discourse about whether that's true or not. I think a huge amount of race dynamics stem from people being worried that other people might or might not be intending to race, or are hiding their intention to race, and so I am generally strongly in favor of transparency.
Fair, I'm grumpy about Leopold's position but my above comment wasn't careful to target the real problems and doesn't give a good general rule here.
For those who are not deep China nerds but want a somewhat approachable lowdown, I can highly recommend Bill Bishop's newsletter Sinocism (enough free issues to be worthwhile) and his podcast Sharp China (the latter is a bit more approachable but requires a subscription to Stratechery).
I'm not a China expert so I won't make strong claims, but I generally agree that we should not treat China as an unknowable, evil adversary who has exactly the same imperial desires as 'the west' or past non-Western regimes. I think it was irresponsible of Aschenbrenner to assume this without better research & understanding, since so much of his argument relies on China behaving in a particular way.
I share your concerns. I spent a decade in China, and I can't count the number of times I've seen people confidently share low-quality or inaccurate perspectives on China. I wish that I had a solution better than "assign everyone the read these [NUMBER] different books."
Even best selling books and articles by well-respected writers sometimes have misleading and inaccurate narratives in them. But it is hard to parse them critically and to provide a counter argument without both the appropriate background[1], and a large number of hours dedicated to the specific effort.
I would be surprised if someone is able to do so without at least an undergraduate background in something like Chinese studies/sinology (or the equivalent, such as a large amount of self-study and independent exploration).
This reading list is an excellent place to start for getting a sense of China x AI (though it doesn't have that much about China's political objectives in general).
Note that you should also understand a) how the US government sees China and why, b) how China sees the US and why in order to be able to have a full analysis here.
Very good point. I hypothesize that the opaque nature of Chinese policy-making (at the national level, setting aside lower-level government) is a key difficulty for anyone outside the upper levels of the Chinese government.