"Starting a company is like chewing glass. Eventually, you start to like the taste of your own blood."
Building a new organization is extremely hard. It's hard when you've done it before, even several times. It's even harder the first time.
Some new organizations are very similar to existing organizations. The founders of the new org can go look at all the previous closeby examples, learn from them, copy their playbook and avoid their mistakes. If your org is shaped like a Y-combinator company, you can spend dozens of hours absorbing high-quality, expert-crafted content which has been tested and tweaked and improved over hundreds of companies and more than a decade. You can do a 15 minute interview to go work next to a bunch of the best people who are also building your type of org, and learn by looking over their shoulder and troubleshooting together. You get to talk to a bunch of people who have actually succeeded building an org-like-yours.
How likely is org building success, in this premier reference class, rich with prior examples to learn from, with a tried and true playbook, a tight community of founder peers, the advice of many people who have tried to do your kind of thing and won?
5%.
https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/y-combinator-accelerator-success-rate-unicorns
An AI safety lab is not the same as a Y-combinator company.
It is. WAY. FUCKING. HARDER.
Y-combinator crowd has a special category for orgs which are trying build something that requires > ~any minor research breakthrough: HARD tech.
Yet the vast majority of these Hard Tech companies are actually building on top of an academic field which basically has the science figured out. Ginkgo Bioworks did not need to figure out the principles of molecular biology, nor the tools and protocols of genetic engineering. They took the a decades old, well-developed paradigm, and worked within it to incrementally build something new.
How does this look for AI safety?
And how about timing. Y-combinator reference class companies take a long time to build. Growing headcount slowly, running lean: absolutely essential if you are stretching out your last funding round over 7 years to iterate your way from a 24 hour livestream tv show of one guy's life to a game streaming company.
Remind me again, what are your timelines?
I could keep going on this for a while. People? Fewer. Funding? Monolithic. Advice from the winners? HA.
Apply these updates to our starting reference class success rate of
ONE. IN. TWENTY.
Now count the AI safety labs.
Multiply by ~3.
That is the roughly the number of people who are not the subject of this post.
For all the rest of us, consider several criticisms and suggestions, which were not feasible to run by the subjects of this post before publication
0. Nobody knows what they are fucking doing when founding and running an AI safety lab and everyone who says they do is lying to you.
1. Nobody has ever seen an organization which has succeeded at this goal.
2. Nobody has ever met the founder of such an organization, nor noted down their qualifications.
3. If the quote at the top of this post doesn't evoke a visceral sense memory for you, consider whether you have an accurate mental picture of what it looks like and feels like to be succeeding at this kind of thing from the inside. Make sure you imagine having fully internalized that FAILURE IS YOUR FAULT and no one else's, and are defining success correctly. (I believe it should be "everyone doesn't die" rather than "be highly respected for your organization's contributions" or "avoid horribly embarrassing mistakes".)
4. If that last bit feels awful and stress inducing, I expect that is because it is. Even for and especially for the handfulls of people who are not the subjects of this post. So much so that I'm guessing that whatever it is that allows people to say "yes" to that responsibility is the ~only real qualification to adding a one to the number of AI safety labs we counted earlier.
5. You have permission. You do not need approval. You are allowed to do stupid things, have no relevant experience, be an embarrassing mess, and even ~*~fail to respond criticism~*~
6. Some of us know what it looks like to be chewing glass, and we have tasted our own blood. We know the difference between the continuous desperate dumpster fires and the real mistakes. We will be silently cheering you through the former and grieving with you on the latter. Sometimes we will write you a snarky post under a pseudonym when we really should be sleeping.
522 companies went through Y-combinator over the last year. Imagine that.
Thank you for reading this loveletter to the demeaning occupation of desperately trying. It's addressed to you, if you'd like.
One way in which AI safety labs are different than the reference class of Y-combinator startups is in their impact. Conditioned on the median Forum user's assessment of X-risk from AI, the leader of a major AI safety lab probably has more impact that the median U.S. senator, Fortune 500 CEO, or chief executive of smaller regional or even national governments, etc. Those jobs are hard in their own ways, but we expect and even encourage an extremely high amount of criticism.
I am not suggesting that is the proper reference class for leaders of AI labs that have raised at least $10MM . . . and I don't think it is. But I think the proper scope of criticism is significantly higher than for (e.g.) the median CEO whose company went through Y Combinator.[1] If a startup CEO messes up and their company explodes, the pain is generally going to be concentrated in the company's investors, lenders, and employees . . . a small number of people, each of whom who consented to bearing that risk to a significant extent. If I'm not one of those people, my standing to complain about the startup CEO's mistakes is significantly constrained.
In contrast, if an AI safety lab goes off the rails and becomes net-negative, that affects us all (and futute generations). Even if the lab is merely ineffective, its existence would have drained fairly scarce resources (potential alignment researchers and EA funding) from others in the field.
I definitively agree that people need to be sensitive to how hard running an AI safety lab is, but also want to affirm that the idea of criticism is legitimate.
To be clear, I don't think Anneal's post suggests that this is the reference class for deciding how much criticism of AI lab leaders is warranted. However, since I didn't see a clear reference class, I thought it was worthwhile to discuss this one.