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The Center for Reducing Suffering (CRS) has opened applications for a new online fellowship, designed to familiarise more individuals with the core ideas of reducing S-Risks (Risks of Astronomical Suffering).

This program is intended for individuals who:

  • Are committed to reducing suffering effectively
  • Have an interest in moral philosophy
  • Are familiar with the core ideas of Effective Altruism
  • Have a degree of understanding of key concepts like cause prioritisation and cause neutrality. (For more information, on cause neutrality you can refer to this essay.)

The fellowship’s curriculum will be broader than the Center on Long-Term Risk’s existing S-Risk fellowship. We envision that graduates of the new CRS fellowship will be in a better position to potentially proceed onto CLR’s fellowship, contribute to s-risk research, and strengthen the s-risk community going forward.

Program Details:

Duration: The fellowship is free of charge and conducted entirely online
Availability: Spots are limited in our initial cohorts to ensure a quality learning experience
Commitment: Expected to be approx 2-4 hours per week for six weeks
Start date: 2nd September 2024

The curriculum will cover topics including:

  • What are s-risks?
  • Arguments for and against a focus on s-risks
  • How can we reduce s-risks?
  • Risk factors for s-risks
  • Worst-case AI safety
  • Improving institutional decision-making
  • Career paths and options
  • Staying motivated and mentally healthy while working on reducing suffering

To apply please fill in the application form on the CRS website. Applications will close on July 31st.

Apply now

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How is this fellowship broader?

The CLR fellowship has more of a focus on specific sources of s-risk (like TAI conflictrisks from malevolent actors).

This curriculum will be broader in the sense that it will cover a wider range of perspectives, types of risk and potential interventions (the CRS S-risks: An introduction post gives a good overview).

We are past 2nd of September. Any hopes?

This looks great; however, I can't seem to find the dates when it will be run? 

Thanks Sam, it'll be starting on the 2nd of September (I've just updated the post, thanks for the heads up)

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