Summary
In January 2026, the animal charity Farmkind launched a controversial news campaign advertising their ability to “offset” the impact of non-vegan diets through strategic donations to EA causes. I have now spoken with several non-vegan EAs who use Farmkind (or similar calculators) to buy “offsets” for their diets, and I think the offsetting logic is more powerful than vegans would like to admit. However, I think EAs generally draw the wrong conclusions from this line of reasoning. Even (maybe especially) under hardcore consequentialism I believe there’s a very strong case to be made against using “offsets” of any kind. As a vegan advocate now working in animal welfare policy, I feel strongly that the reluctance of many EAs to commit to veganism represents a major missed opportunity for the movement, and an objectively massive source of animal suffering.
How Offsets Work
By going vegan, you can reduce total market demand by something like ~200 animals (excluding shrimp) every year (1). However, due both to the astonishing number of animals killed for food every year and the immense tractability of targeted welfare reforms, going vegan is far from the most effective way to help animals. Farmkind estimates that donating only $276 to effective charities accomplishes exactly the same welfare improvements as veganism.
This kind of calculation might seem slightly fishy or underhanded. One reasonable objection was made in Clare Zabel’s 2015 EA Forum post, which pointed out that it is difficult to establish which charities are most appropriate to use as offsets, since the class of animals being helped is by definition distinct from the class of animal being harmed; a problem she referred to as using “vague and arbitrary reference classes.”
Indeed, Farmkind’s calculator sometimes seems to make use of some pretty far-out claims about animal preferences—for instance, the claim that two chickens raised under the guidelines of the Better Chicken Commitment experience the same net suffering as one normally farmed chicken. It is somewhat disturbing to think of one animal’s welfare being “sacrificed” to save the welfare of another.
However, I do not think that this problem is endemic to offsetting. To some degree, these kinds of calculations across moral subjects are bread-and-butter for EAs. We have no problem sacrificing our own welfare, in the form of financial deprivation, to make donations to those in greater need.
Furthermore, at least in the case of veganism, I think there are several strong contenders for appropriate offsetting reference classes. To me the most obvious choice is Sociedade Vegetariana Brasiliera, which is estimated to replace 116 animal-based meals per dollar. Assuming that the average non-vegan American eats 2,000 meals per year, of which perhaps 1,800 include animal products, then a donation of only $16 would be sufficient to neutralize his annual impact on the world’s net demand for animal products, without any need for elaborate welfare calculations.
But even Farmkind’s more generous number is still disappointingly low. To many EAs I have spoken to, it seems to imply that going vegan is only “worth” a paltry $276—or alternatively, that donating at least $276 to pro-animal charities “buys” them the freedom from being vegan.
Why Offsets Don’t Really Exist
I believe that these last two comments (which were taken from real conversations I have had with EAs) display a logical misunderstanding of what donations are, and how they work.
This misunderstanding is encouraged by the marketing term “offset.” As Farmkind explained in a January 2026 EA Forum post, “our core message [is] that you don’t have to be vegan to help animals. We think that many people who are not willing to change their diet currently assume that there’s nothing for them to do about factory farming. We want them to know that’s not the case, opening the door to future actions for animals and a shift in their identity towards being ‘pro-animal’.”
This post makes it clear that Farmkind’s campaign is oriented at non-EAs. It is not trying to get normal people to do the most good, but to do any good at all. Ethically speaking, there should be nothing special to a consequentialist about donating $276 rather $27,600—you should always donate as much as you feel able to. The word “offset” is only a motivating fiction to make consumers feel guiltier, and hence more likely to donate. In this way it resembles the charities that ask people to donate some amount that is “less the price of your morning cup of coffee.” It plays on deontological sentiments about what you are “personally obligated” to do versus what is “not your problem.”
Other EA cause areas rarely consider “offsets,” both because it feels disrespectful and because offsetting even a single human life is so expensive. For instance, we do not ask great powers to simply “offset” the human cost of war by donating to the Against Malaria Foundation—we work actively both to reduce great power conflict and to increase funding for malaria prevention. The two facts are independent.
Perversely, however, the remarkably low price of saving a single animal’s life (just a couple cents) seems to be sometimes interpreted to diminish the value of that life—to make it seem like a rounding error, only “worth” a stick of gum. Around 50% of EAs are neither vegan nor vegetarian, often because of this belief in the “cheapness” of animal life. Conservatively estimating around 10,000 active EAs, that comes to nearly one million animals being slaughtered annually to feed a community that routinely ranks animal welfare as one of its top priorities.
In this way, perhaps pro-animal EA charities have become too effective!
What Should You Do Instead?
A critical piece of the previous argument is that eating a vegan diet is independent of one’s ability to donate—in other words, that you may always do both. Indeed, if you are at all concerned about animal welfare, the EA ethic to do the most good demands that you do both. If you’re donating $20,000/year to charity, you should also be vegan. If you’re donating $20,276/year to charity, you should still also be vegan. It is a standing opportunity to save hundreds of lives.
But some EAs I have spoken to are afraid that going vegan will reduce their productivity or earnings by more than $276/year. If this were true, then I wholeheartedly endorse their decision to eat an omnivorous diet and donate their extra earnings wherever they please.
However, I think there are at least three reasons to consider this fear more carefully.
- Cost savings. According to a study conducted by the University of Oxford, vegan diets reduce annual food costs by 21-34% in high-income countries, which would save the average American about $2,796 per year (and around $4,800 for Americans in the top income quintile). An observational study of 11,000 Britons confirmed savings of 40% by those eating a vegan diet.
- Social multipliers. While causal mechanisms are difficult to determine, it is well established that being vegan significantly increases the odds that people around you will decrease their animal consumption. It also provides statistically significant social validation for existing vegans, who are consequently much more likely to remain vegan. (I personally went vegan at the urging of a vegan friend several years ago—in fact, it was going vegan that drew me into EA). 52% of new vegans report that someone else has tried veganism as a result of their decision. Conservatively, each vegan might plausibly create/preserve 5-10 other vegans over the course of a lifetime, and reduce the animal consumption of 10-50 more.
Health effects. Nutrition is a notoriously complex and person-specific issue. However, it is very clear that a reasonable vegan diet does not raise serious health concerns. At a population level, meat-less diets are often associated with a reduction in all-cause mortality around 10-15%. This might allow vegan EAs to remain productive for several more years than non-vegan EAs.
The first two facts alone threaten to push the “price” of veganism for the average EA significantly higher than Farmkind’s estimate, potentially above ~$4,000 per year. (If a vegan diet did extend your working life by several years, as the most sophisticated comparative model currently predicts, that would represent a massive increase in total earnings—but this question is technically unsettled and awaits more precise causal studies.) In other words, productivity savings from not being vegan should certainly exceed $4,000 in order for a consequentialist to feel secure in their decision.
But even this number does not account for several broader consequences of veganism, including:
- Increased accuracy in animal sentience estimates. A couple famous studies have confirmed that even the act of anticipating consumption of animal products later reduces your estimates for both animal sentience and intelligence. These effects are probably dampened among EAs, who think harder about these issues than the general public. But in a field with as much uncertainty as animal welfare ranges, it seems important to do everything we can to keep our heads unclouded by motivated reasoning.
- Investment in alternative-protein development. Purchasing vegan meat (Beyond, Impossible, Tofurky) directs additional cash flow towards alternative-protein development—one of the most important destinations of EA animal welfare funding today. It also encourages stores to keep the brands in prominent positions on the shelves or on the menu, which increases both sales and brand awareness.
Boosting the social credibility of animal welfare. The general public is conflicted about farmed animal welfare. They are uniformly against animal cruelty, but uniformly for eating animals. Furthermore, they never donate to animal welfare charities and do not prioritize pro-animal ballot initiatives or political candidates. Speaking to people about veganism can raise the profile of the issue—not just for those considering going vegan, but for the general public.
Given all of these factors, I believe that EAs should think more seriously about adopting a vegan diet. Diet change is often perceived as more difficult than it actually is: according to Veganuary, 81% of people that undertake their 31-day challenge make significant cuts to their animal-product consumption. If all of the non-vegan EAs simply signed up for Veganuary’s challenge, we might expect to save hundreds of thousands of animals—a significant accomplishment for the movement and a declaration of faith in our own principles.
(1) This number varies significantly between estimates, depending on whether you count “bycatch”—that is, the less desirable fish accidentally killed while trawling for wild fish. Farmkind’s estimate is 41 animals per person per year, but they do not count bycatch.
"Conservatively, each vegan might plausibly create/preserve 5-10 other vegans over the course of a lifetime"
The word 'might' is doing a lot of heavy lifting here. If veganism actually had this kind of multiplier, we would expect the number of vegans to grow by 5X each generation. Vegetarianism hasn't experienced this kind of generational growth. I think claiming veganism will have this growth rate is an extraordinary claim that would require extraordinary evidence.
[I say this as a lacto-veg who doesn't personally do offsetting, but tbh that is more from a moral purity vs harm minimization standpoint]
If every vegan turned 5 other people over the course of their lifetime, then we would only expect the number of vegans to grow something like 10x over a whole lifetime - 60 years or so - and the number of vegans has in fact grown enormously since the 1970s. Besides, many vegans who are included in surveys do not intend to stick with their diet, or do not want to seem "preachy," and so have less of an effect on their immediate circle.
However, population-level data on vegans is pretty spotty and you're right that I don't have any good evidence besides the Veganuary study cited in the piece, which only asked how many people surrounding the subject had tried veganism in a period of six months after the trial period.
The claim is primarily based on (1) my own experience, having been vegan for three years and having so far turned two close friends vegan and one vegetarian (2) my experience with professional activists, who can often turn one person vegan every week just by tabling for an hour or two. If you speak to other serious vegans (such as the commenter below who mentioned "several people") I suspect that they'll give you a similar number.
I think you're assuming that those converts stay veg*n, which seems moderately unlikely. I don't doubt that you are accurately reflecting your experience, but I do think you haven't seen the long-term effects.
This article claims around 82% of veg*ns eventually lapse, which means a 5X conversion rate is actually only enough to keep the movement steady. https://faunalytics.org/a-summary-of-faunalytics-study-of-current-and-former-vegetarians-and-vegans/
Given that Gallup polls have consistently shown 4-6% of US folks were vegetarian over the last 30 years, I think that approximate maintenance is more plausible than strong exponential growth.
Funny diversion, if you really think that a vegan will make 5 converts over their lifetime (who will do the same etc), then we are only 3 generations away from complete veganism (1% -> 5% -> 25% -> 100%). So the value of a marginal vegan matters less for their multiplier effect, since we'll be fully saturated in 3 generations anyways. The direct impact still matters, of course.
Right - the assumption here is that only a small minority of vegans (<10%) are currently committed and vocal enough to be actively convincing their friends and family. Like you said, the high recidivism rate has to be currently being counterbalanced by opposite forces to keep the population of vegans steady (which is more or less what we’ve observed over recent decades). And from conversations with other committed vegans, I think a big chunk of that “maintenance” is being accomplished by the persuasive efforts of committed vegans - which all EAs have the power to become!
This is a really interesting, thoughtful, and empathetic post.
But I had kinda the opposite objection to offsets lol. :-)
I very much applaud people who eat meat and donate to fight farmed animal cruelty. Such people have done, and can do, so much good for animals.
I just worry offsets may focus people on feeling guilty for eating meat. I don't think people need to feel guilty for eating meat. Animal cruelty isn't the fault of the consumer. Consumers want the animals they eat to be treated humanely. Indeed, consumers consistently pay extra for labels that suggest the animal was treated humanely. Animal cruelty is the fault of companies and executives that abuse animals. These companies often intentionally mislead consumers with humanewashing. Consumers should have the right to buy meat and assume the animal was treated humanely. Indeed, the general public has voted for laws against animal abuse! For example, cruelty is a crime in every single US state and, as Charles mentions, the public in many states has even explicitly banned things like battery cages via direct democracy. So whose fault is it when companies commit animal cruelty despite the law? In my mind, it's squarely the company's or its executive's fault—not the fault of the public that voted to outlaw cruelty and then attempted to buy products that the public thought were humane.
And I think that people feeling guilty for eating meat is, ironically, bad for animals. I have heard there is some research to suggest that when people feel guilty toward a group, it actually makes people less empathetic toward that group! It makes sense. If we think, "the other political party is hurting X group of people," we feel bad for X group and want to help them. If we think "my political party is hurting X group of people," our defense mechanisms kick in and we immediately start coming up with reasons why what we're doing to X people really isn't that bad, or is necessary, or is deserved, in order to protect our self image. Then we just try to think about something else, instead of intervening to help X group. It's usually easier to grapple with someone else's misdeeds than our own. So why encourage the public to think of Big Ag's misdeeds as their own?
I suspect that part of the reason the public does so little to improve the plight of animals in factory farms may be because many members of the public wrongly feel like they have no moral standing to complain about the treatment of animals because they already eat meat. This is just what animal abusers want the public to think.
I want to fight back against the idea that anyone who eats meat is part of the problem. I want everyone to feel like we are benevolent heroes who absolutely have moral standing to complain about Big Ag's treatment of animals. I think that's the best way to encourage people to fight back.
To be clear: I agree it is GREAT to help animals through donations!
And I think people should donate joyously and feel good about donating—not just feel like they're doing it to compensate or atone for something.
I also suspect that people who donate joyously may end up giving more than people who are donating to compensate or atone. Because if you enjoy something, you're inspired to do the maximum amount of it! If I feel great whenever I donate money, why would I stop at my "offset" amount? I'd keep giving until it no longer made me feel great (perhaps because it caused a noticeable decrease in my quality of life), which might end up being ten times the offset amount. What I've learned from fundraising is that most people who give a lot of money to charity seem to really enjoy giving money to charity! More broadly, I've noticed people tend to do more of any behavior that they enjoy. So I think we should frame donating as joyful and heroic, not some kind of duty or apology.
Plus, if someone sees their friend happily donating to a pro-animal charity, they may want to mimic their friend and join in on the donating. But if someone sees their friend sadly and shamefully donating out of guilt, I doubt they'll be inspired to mimic their friend and join in.
Lastly, blaming consumers deflects blame from meat companies for the companies' treatment of animals. Consumer-blame rhetoric lets meat companies claim they're only giving in to consumer demand. That's bad for animals. In reality, a single company has way more control over animal welfare than any consumer. A meat company can affect hundreds of millions or billions of animal lives by a decision the company makes on a random day. We should make sure activists, the public, lawmakers, and judges keep our focus on meat companies and work to change the behavior of meat companies, rather than getting distracted by thinking about consumers.
I got this idea from my friend and former colleague who is an environmental activist. She explained to me that the environmental movement used to focus on blaming consumers for buying products and encouraging consumers to recycle. She explained that it wasn't very effective and deflected blame from companies that actually have way more control over the environment than consumers. She said that the more modern trend in the environmental movement is to focus on holding companies accountable for their decisions, and encouraging the public to become activists. That has struck with me for a long time. If the animal movement is going to ask the public to do something, I want us to encourage the public to vote for pro-animal politicians, donate to pro-animal causes, and pressure companies to treat animals better. And I think the best way to get the public to do that is to focus the public on companies' behavior.
So I guess, I would push back on both this very thoughtful and kind post (because I don't think people need to go vegan if they care about animals) and also the very thoughtful and kind idea of offsets (because I don't blame the public for farmed animal cruelty).
To be clear, I applaud anyone who does anything to help animals—people who go vegan to help animals, people who donate to offset their meat eating to help animals, people who set up offsetting campaigns to help animals, and people who make EA Forum posts encouraging others to go vegan to help animals. I just predict that the best outcome for animals will come on focusing more on how much good we can do and less on how much we can blame ourselves.
Interested in others' thoughts on my perspective!
I find the measurement-based arguments compelling. What shifted my perspective on offsetting was something I heard recently:
Consider a friend you genuinely admire. Then you discover that occasionally, they steal homeless people's blankets (or whatever else). Your view of them would change dramatically — not because the "net harm" calculation works out a certain way, but because the behavior reveals something about their character that can't be neutralized by good deeds elsewhere.
Anyways, this just makes me think how veganism is about moral consistency, which is something you can't offset.
(I say this as someone who was vegan for 4 yrs and now am no longer, but am now reconsidering my non-veganism re these influences)
I couldn't agree more. I'm vegan for only 6 years now and already convinced several people to go either vegetarian, almost vegan or reduce their meat consumption. (No total victory yet, unfortunately) It also enabled me to have literally hundreds of deep talks about animal suffering. People listen to people who are close to them. You are in an unique postion to influence your very own social circle and you shouldn't let it pass if you are truly commited in doing the most good.
I think you make a lot of really good points.
When we consider the validity of an offsetting program, I think it's important to remember where offsetting came from. Carbon offsets were introduced because some aspects of human life necessitate emissions (like manufacturing or energy production), and carbon offset credits are meant to give organizations a way to "make up" for the emissions they couldn't otherwise avoid. We allow a certain amount of moral equivalence between refraining from emissions and offsetting emissions because there is no viable alternative.
The disconnect, in the diet offsetting case, is that most EAs don't live a life that necessitates meat consumption, so I don't think we should the same sense of moral equivalence between refraining from meat and purchasing diet offsets.
Regarding the social multiplier, financial effect on vegan products, and boosting the social credibility of animal welfare, it seems like you are making the case that "offsetting" should take the full counterfactual difference between being an omnivore and a vegan, which includes the positive effects of being a vegan as well as the avoidance of the negative effects of being an omnivore. I would be interested in seeing attempts at calculating the value of these positive effects, attempted to be cashed out in terms of funding for farmed animal charities.
I agree that thinking of these donations in terms of offsetting is not right. Your ability to donate to animal welfare is basically unrelated to your ability to stop consuming animal products, and doing one does not affect your ethical obligation to do the other, as you said.
What I would encourage and do think is right is to consider how you can do the most good, and donating to animal welfare is a highly effective way to do that. Therefore, it seems incumbent upon both vegans and non-vegans that they donate. Being vegan does not free you from the obligation to donate anymore than donating frees you from the obligation to be vegan.
I say this as a non-vegan. I am highly interested in veganism, but do not feel like I can really handle the transition in this current phase of life I'm in. But I resolved to donate, not as an offset, but because I care about animals, and I feel obligated to do the most good I can. I also strive to reduce the amount of animal products I consume, and I try to seek out more humane sources for those I do use.
Doubtless, a vegan looking at my life might question whether the complication is really worth it. I certainly have a guilty conscience and feel empathy for the animals whose suffering I am causing. Am I trying to 'offset' those feelings by doing what I can? Certainly I am to some degree. Whether that is good or bad seems like a personal question, but I think all EA's would agree that, regardless of one's personal moral imbrication in another person's suffering, the goal should be to do as much good as possible.