I will attempt to present an argument that claims that moral offsetting - for example, in the workplace - is unnecessary and perhaps counterproductive to EA's principles. This argument analyzes the case of a student who has just secured employment, like many other graduating students, at a (generally considered) reprehensible organization. In this student's case, we consider his employment at Lockheed Martin, and whether moral offsetting is necessary.
An AI summary online (pulling sources from Wikipedia and the University of Oxford) defined moral offsetting as:
"Moral offsetting is the idea of counterbalancing a morally questionable action (like eating meat) by performing a good deed, often a donation to a related charity (animal welfare or environmental), to neutralize the negative moral impact, aiming to make the overall situation better or at least morally neutral, similar to carbon offsetting, but it raises questions about whether serious wrongs can truly be "paid for" and if it just licenses bad behavior."
My argument uses a Nietzschean framework to arrive at my conclusions, in that the guilt that leads one to moral offsetting is misplaced. Perhaps, it should not be guilt per say, but inspiration and effort directed at another source.
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In the drift of circumstance, a bright young undergraduate student (Michael) secured employment at one of the most successful but morally fraught organizations in the world. He has worked his entire life to secure this job; we must assume that he is fully aware of this organization’s moral transgressions but is still keen on accepting his employment anyway. To combat this moral dilemma (as this individual directly motivates this organization’s interests, and thus, participates in the moral dilemma firsthand), he suffers the ache of guilt and considers philanthropy in the phenomenon known as moral offsetting. He might hope to offset his involvement in this organization by donating to charity.
In dilemmas like these, this paper will examine the agent’s responsibility and moral offsetting under Nietzsche’s framework of guilt. We will first consider the five most salient premises that ground my argument: First, there are organizations that do extreme harm. Second, there are charities that do a comparable force of good. Third, the traditional arguments in support of moral offsetting fail. Fourth, there are prospective employees that would replace you if you decided to quit. And fifth, there are individuals (like Michael) deliberating whether or not to offset their measurable contribution to an “extremely” corrupt organization (extreme in that it is generally observed as immoral compared to most organizations, the immorality of which is of course taken as an implied premise, but I will not attempt to illustrate why this is or should be the case).
In these premises, my central argument is that moral offsetting is not necessary or obligatory because the guilt that leads us to moral offsetting is critically misplaced. The practical solutions to these moral dilemmas lies not with these employed agents (students like Michael) but with other forces, in government intervention or in stringent Congressional oversight of morally questionable organizations. The application of this oversight or any other accountability methods, however, is not within the dialogue of the paper. It is, however, in my personal belief, within the creative liberty of all of us.
Let us consider, first, the effects of hundreds of the globe’s worst organizations throughout history—effects of which continue now.1 Young “go-getters” are caught in these vicious moral dilemmas: Chase your passion, work hard, do good in this world, but voluntarily participate in your organizations’ intentional global catastrophes? Individuals interested in food service and business management apply to Nestlé, a transnational corporation involved in child labor, union-busting activity, modern slavery, “actively spreading disinformation about recycling,” and “illegal water-pumping from drought-stricken Native American reservations.”2 Nestlé knowingly marketed (on multiple occasions) milk and baby formula products in underdeveloped countries that “caused about 212,000 infant deaths per year among mothers without clean water access at the peak of the Nestlé controversy in 1981.”3 Michael, interested in aerodynamics (a STEM major), secured a role at Lockheed Martin, which “has been named as an integral company in supplying arms and services to the Saudi Arabia/UAE-led coalition. Lockheed Martin weaponry was notably linked to a widely condemned school bus attack in 2018 that resulted in the deaths of dozens of children.”4
Consider my second premise that charities promote good comparable to organizations that perpetuate harm. William MacAskill best outlines these charities in his novel Doing Good Better,5 to which he highlights organizations like Malaria Consortium that have provided 32 million mosquito nets to those in malaria-prone/underdeveloped areas, saving hundreds of thousands of lives with malaria prevention.6 If we donate to organizations like these, we save lives. MacAskill calculates that it only takes a few thousand dollars to save one life; that is, if we donate to the places outlined by the effective altruism movement.7 This premise dismisses any (potentially extreme) claims that raise concerns on the effectiveness of EA's philanthropy, particularly claims that attack the core of EA's philanthropy as worthless; the function of this premise is to solidify moral offsetting as a (potentially) serious moral possibility for Michael.
Thirdly, we must consider the traditional arguments for moral offsetting’s failure. Michael’s participation in Lockheed Martin (say, their research in bomb engineering) indirectly killed those schoolchildren in the buses in 2018. Those children are dead; in a pit of guilt, then, Michael considers donating $50,000 to the Malaria Consortium to offset the blood on his hands. The traditional critique of this action argues that offsetting (in this extreme case) is impermissible because the children have died—this is irreversible. This critique argues that moral offsetting puts a price on a human life, and may even license those that work in immoral fields to continue indirectly killing those in precarious communities. An irreversible, life-ending, immoral action cannot be reconciled with a similar, life-saving, moral effort: While the latter is righteous, those that are gone by the former action are not avenged by a similarly matched motive for good.
I think it is necessary to briefly elaborate on the purpose of this premise. Again, following MacAskill's reasoning in Doing Good Better, a life-ending immoral action cannot be reconciled with a life-saving moral effort. We cannot buy and trade lives. With this considered, I will eventually show that even if it was possible to offset in this way, Michael would not be obligated to offset by donating to life-saving EA charities. I included this premise as background to Michael's thought process, and perhaps, the thought processes of many Effective Altruists "earning to give" in immoral organizations. Of course, many non-EA workers in these situations feel guilty and donate through non-effective means, or do not consider the inconsistencies of moral offsetting in the first place. For those who do not encounter this exact argument, perhaps they implicitly recognize this moral flaw when they consider which charities to donate to and how much is required to offset; at this point, it seems natural to me that most would forgo charity altogether. I think this premise touches on the background of many of these workers:
a) (best case scenario) Guilty EA-minded workers, perhaps "earning to give," feel trapped by MacAskill's reasoning. They are likely to feel guilty, but they donate effectively, even in light of MacAskill's reasoning above. Michael might be in this camp, considering he donates effectively.
b) Guilty non-EA workers who decide to donate, to which they donate an arbitrary amount and may even feel additionally guilty for.
c) Guilty non-EA workers who, in light of this reasoning or the ambigious nature of philanthropy, forgo philanthropy altogether. They create their own defeating perspective or moral judgment on the pointlessness of philanthropy, or even the pointlessness or EA. These individuals are the most dangerous because their natural guilt degrades over time, and as they become accustomed to the immoralities of their organizations, they increasingly participate first-hand in the structure of the organization's evils. This directly mirrors, for example, Hannah Arendt's "banality of evil."
(At this point, one may reasonably assume that I am tangentially claiming that Michael is in some way liable for the wrongdoing of the organization, and that I will eventually refute this intuition. Someone can reasonably argue that Michael is not liable at all in the first place. This becomes a subtle point, since I am proposing that Michael should reframe his guilt from his involvement—which still leaves the real question of his responsibility on the table, and perhaps implies that he is liable or responsible in some way, if there is guilt. I stand by the claim that Michael is liable but the guilt arising from this liability can be acted on in a more productive, life-affirming way, as we will soon see; personally, I believe a world where all well-off employees feel at least some sense of guilt (and are inspired to act on it) is better than a world without, which I also believe is the primary reason for EA's founding. However, I do not need to illustrate this "liability argument"—as long as there is guilt, we can resolve Michael's moral dilemma in the context of moral offsetting initiatives specifically).
Fourth, there are individuals in the job market who would replace Michael’s morally ambiguous position at Lockheed Martin if he decided to quit.
And finally, fifth, this leaves our student weighing his options. In the extreme I proposed earlier, Michael might even feel exceptionally guilty about their involvement to where they eventually consider not just if offsetting is necessary but what specific dollar amount is enough to “contain” the blood on his hands—in this case, he deliberates regardless of my third premise that moral offsetting fails by traditional arguments. Michael is closely aligned with the EA movement. And Michael does not care that offsetting traditionally fails: The guilt is too burdensome. As long as there is guilt in some way, our core pretense is satisfied. Michael feels that he is obligated to donate to charity.
With these premises in mind, we can now examine why Michael’s sense of guilt is misdirected and why moral offsetting is unnecessary. We are left with the question: Should Michael still feel guilty about their position at this job? Should this student, even if the traditional arguments in support of moral offsetting fail, attempt to offset their job impact?
My answer is certainly "negative." Of course, he can feel shocked in his discovery of his organization's wrongdoing. But, given our five premises, he ought not feel guilty, or at least, he ought not feel guilty in a way that would inspire him into obligatory moral offsetting.
My first reason: Michael is a social force, maximizing his potential, and living up to his expectations. The guilt he experiences is an upshot of inward-directed cruelty, or a form of Nietzsche’s “bad conscience,” further incentivized by misplaced public scrutiny.8 Individuals and corporations punish themselves for immoral policies rather than addressing the root cause of their destructive impulses. This symbolic “offsetting debt” is a mask, covering the true origins of organizational wrongdoing: A critical lack of governmental oversight. Individuals are simply a cog in the wheel of social pressures, pursuing their passions and wrongly feeling guilty for it.
My second reason: Guilt in this case is a will to nothingness.9 Following Nietzsche's critique of asceticism (we should embrace the natural pursuits of pleasure rather than reject them), Michael’s guilt engages him in symbolic moral gestures (offsetting), guilt rituals, and self-denial. This is willing nothingness—committing to a life that denies the bare truth of existence—as we are indisputably pleasure-striving beings following careers and objectives tethered to our natural interests. When society directs guilt on Michael, we avoid an “overman” pursuit.10 Society would rather blame new company conscripts—easy targets—than pursue a world order that holds international organizations accountable.
My third reason: Guilt-inspired offsetting is bound in slave morality.11 Those that are not powerful (weak student conscripts) feel guilty for the actions of the powerful. The few, or the powerful elected representatives, are the ones really permitting injustice. Slave morality is formed in this way: A weak slave wrongly feels guilty about their impact, makes an arbitrary attempt at moral offsetting, and then frames this action as a virtuous moral deed. They must scrutinize their guilt and subsequent offsetting not as a sign of selfless moral virtue, but a blindness to the true causes of his guilt—offsetting becomes not a moral virtue but an avoidance of the pursuit of real solutions. Michael must reframe his guilt to pursue real moral virtues and not repentant, pity-borne offsetting (this pity being for their own powerlessness and for the unequal world they live in). He must embrace his guilt to become the change he wishes to see in the world: This student must become the overman.12 He must cultivate the master.
This segways into our first counterargument: We are powerless to become the change we wish to see. How could we demand our government hold CEOs and organizations accountable, especially if our governments are neglectful and cruel with policies equally as so?
Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence demands we should live as if we would repeat all of our actions into eternity.13 We must affirm our choices in this way. If we really knew what was right, we would take the necessary path to prevent evil. We must truly know what is causing our guilt: A society that fails to correct blatant injustices is a society that makes us shameful to be a part of. We must all do what we can to correct this, even if the path ahead is treacherous.
Critically, the traits of an overman do not lie with everyone. Only the most daring, calculated, and motivated can fight. Change often comes from a few. This paper does not question the feasibility of a plan, but demands we reframe our guilt as a mechanism of powerful, real change.
Secondly, another salient counterargument focuses on the arbitrary “line in the sand.” Where would you draw the line, especially if Michael became the CEO of this company?
If Michael was a true overman and understood why he feels guilty, he would do everything in his power to reduce the unfair practices of his organization. That would mean, as a CEO, preventing the continued injustices of his organization. Every promotion would be a new opportunity to amend the internal operations that promote the injustice.
Finally, a third counterargument might address the idea that someone would replace this student anyway—if the person who will replace you (likely) has no interest in donating to charity, might you have an obligation to stay in your position and commit to offsetting?
This ignores my main thesis that guilt, in the first place, is a misrepresentation of an underlying call to action or an underlying call for progress. Why would Michael not try to maintain his position without offsetting, maximize their chances at becoming a CEO at the organization, and then collectively implement policies that scale back the harm the organization promulgates? He might be able to save a lot more people this way. Why would he not try to stay in the company, make as much money as he can, run a massive campaign for Congress, and then enact change directly on a governmental level? The possibilities are endless. Unfortunately, guilt-inspired offsetting that is obligatory can get in the way of real change.
It is at this juncture I would like to clear a crucial inconsistency: Michael can morally offset insofar as he came to this reasoning not out of obligatory concern, but out of independent, evidence-driven, EA-principled analysis. Of course, he would still suffer the contradiction in premise three, and he would still have to contend with the counterfactuals proposed above (relative to his situation).
If one concludes that donating (an arbitrary amount of) their paycheck will be overall-effective at promoting welfare, perhaps moral offsetting would work in some cases. While it is contradictory, it is better than nothing. Ultimately, as we are mistake-driven moral agents, forced to make arbitrary, subjective, messy decisions with some level of regret in each choice, in social systems that work against us. What we might be able to conclude for certain is that there is no correct path in these moral dilemmas. If I am correct, though, an obligatory construction of moral offsetting as the only moral answer can be misdirected and self-defeating. Maybe the best case scenario is Michael becomes a CEO, enacts reform on this level, pools his resources to run for Congress, enacts change on a governmental level, and then lives a modest life donating to EA-aligned charities.
To conclude, our student need not feel guilty about his involvement in Lockheed Martin because, as Nietzsche proves, guilt is wrongly placed on the individuals in these corporations. In its extreme form, it is the government’s failure (whether that is neglect, lobbying, or backward tax agendas) to hold chief-ranking executives responsible for indirect human rights violations. Governments incentivize their evil in the first place and have all the enforcement necessary to reduce it. Today, the overmen, change-makers, and go-getters must liberate us from the beginning of the end: Unrestrained late-stage capitalism in a global march to corporatocracy.
So, is not our fault. The people we have elected to lead—in a contract of liberty—are bought and sold. They do not have our interests (or perhaps human decency) in mind. It reminds us of Michael’s true role in all of this: A commodity for a company’s disposal with hopes, dreams, social rebuke, and unwarranted guilt. Moral offsetting is not necessary because the guilt that leads us to offset is critically misplaced: This guilt is but a calling for overman progress, in whatever manifestation that will be.
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My reflections after completing and reflecting on this article:
Sources:
