Learning that some person or group of people hold certain views may sometimes provide valid grounds for epistemic deference, that is, for updating our own beliefs in response to what others appear to believe, even if we ignore the reasons for those beliefs or do not find those reasons persuasive. The question of when, how, and to what extent a rational agent should defer to others has been studied—from somewhat different angles—by philosophers working in social epistemology and by economists working in game theory.

Further reading

Aird, Michael (2020) Collection of discussions of epistemic modesty, “rationalist*EA exceptionalism”, and similar, LessWrong, March 30.
Many additional resources on this topic or related topics.

LessWrong (2021) Modest epistemology, LessWrong Wiki, April 7.

Frances, Bryan & Jonathan Matheson (2018) Disagreement, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, February 23 (updated 13 November 2019).

Huemer, Michael (2019) On challenging the experts, Fake Nous, July 6.

altruistic coordination | discussion norms | expertise | independent impressions | inside vs. outside view | moral trade | principle of epistemic deference