Hide table of contents
by [anonymous]
5 min read 7

75

I have recently looked into the threat of 'peak phosphorous' and thought I would quickly share my findings, as phosphorous is arguably one of the more plausible 'peak resource theories'. I conclude that the risk of phosphorous depletion to global food security are minimal. 

***

‘Peak phosphorous’ is one of the more popular ‘peak resource’ theories, along with ‘peak oil’.[1] Phosphorous is essential for food production, and has no substitutes. Organic sources of phosphorous, such as crop residues, food waste, excreta, are classed as renewable. Phosphate rock on the other hand is classed as non-renewable and finite because it cycles from the lithosphere to the hydrosphere at rates of millions of years. When they are used in agriculture, phosphorous molecules are not being destroyed, they are just being redistributed around the world.[2] But still rock phosphate is, for practical purposes, finite because, once used, it cannot feasibly be retrieved for millions of years, at least at reasonable energetic cost.

Since supplies of phosphorous rock are finite, many argue that if current consumption continues, unless remedial action is taken, phosphorous use will peak in the next few decades, which might threaten global food security or even lead to global catastrophe.[3]

Before we discuss this, when considering peak resource theories, it is important to define the difference between reserves and resources (USGS p195):

Resource = A concentration of naturally occurring phosphate material in such a form or amount that economic extraction of a product is currently or potentially feasible

Reserve base = The part of an identified resource that meets minimum criteria related to current mining and production practices including grade, quality, thickness and depth. 

Reserve = The part of the reserve base which can be economically extracted or produced at the time of the determination. This may be termed marginal, inferred or inferred marginal reserves. This does not signify that the extraction facilities are in place or functional.

On this definition, reserves are a dynamic figure: they will change depending on demand, scarcity and market prices. If scarcity increases, then the price will increase, producers will have greater incentive to find and exploit new reserves, and consumers will have incentives to economise on consumption or to recycle. 

Resources are also dynamic as we might discover new deposits that we did not previously know about. 

As we would expect, reserves of phosphorous change significantly all the time. In 2020, the US Geological Survey estimated that phosphorous reserves were 71 billion tons (p123), up from 16 billion tons in 2010 (p119). 

In 2020, consumption of phosphate was 47 million tonnes. At current rates of consumption, it would take 1,500 years to use up the world’s phosphorous reserves, on the (false) assumption that reserves will remain static. According to the US Geological Survey, phosphate rock resources are 300 billion tons. So, at current rates of consumption, it would take more than 6,000 years to use up all phosphorous resources. 

[EDIT: See the comment by Dave Denkenberger below. Assuming that current consumption continues and reserves stay static, reserves will be used up in 260 years, not 1500. For resources, the true figure is 1,390 years] 

Moreover, there is ample scope for improvement in the efficiency of consumption of phosphorous. 

As this shows, despite huge increases in food yields, phosphate consumption has been flat in North America since 1970 and declined dramatically in Europe since 1987. 

Fertiliser use in low and middle-income countries is much less efficient than in rich countries. Li et al (2015) estimate that in China 2.2kg of phosphorous per hectare was lost in crop and animal production systems, compared to rates of 0.4kg per hectare in Sweden and 0.5kg per hectare in the UK and Ireland.[4]  This suggests that fivefold phosphorous efficiency improvements are possible just by moving China to Western standards. 

In general, the use of phosphorous is very inefficient. 80% of the phosphorous in rock never reaches the food consumed by humans, but is lost at all stages. During mining and fertiliser production, as much as 30–40% of phosphorus can be lost during extraction and primary processing, while much of the phosphorus entering livestock and cropping systems ends up in manure and soils respectively[5] 

If the price of phosphorous does rise due to mounting scarcity, there would be lots of scope to economise on phosphorous consumption, and huge market incentives to do so. 

Phosphorous depletion poses minimal risks to agriculture.

Footnotes

[1] Dana Cordell and Stuart White, ‘Peak Phosphorus: Clarifying the Key Issues of a Vigorous Debate about Long-Term Phosphorus Security’, Sustainability 3, no. 10 (October 2011): 2027–49, https://doi.org/10.3390/su3102027.

[2] "However, the element phosphorus is not running out. According to the Law of Mass Conservation, phosphorus molecules cannot be created or destroyed. There are a fixed number of phosphorus atoms on the planet (meteors aside) and phosphorus cycles naturally between the lithosphere and hydrosphere, between land, biota and soil and between aquatic biota and aquatic sediments. Further, phosphorus is the 11th most abundant element in the earth’s crust (amounting to some 4,000,000,000,000,000 tons P), so not considered a geochemically scarce element. Clarity in this regard is therefore important for scientific credibility. Discussions regarding shortage or scarcity are related to the irreversible depletion of high-concentration rock phosphate reserves and the economic and energetic barriers to their exploitation as discussed in the next section." Cordell and White (2011), p. 2029.

[3] For examples, see Vaclav Smil, We’re Not Running Out of Fertilizer. See also this post by CSER researchers. "Climate change’s impact on biosphere integrity (discussed in the previous section) could harm the human food system due to loss of ecosystem services, disruption of the cycles of water, nitrogen and phosphates, and changes in the dynamics of plant and animal health (Bélanger and Pilling 2019). Crossing this planetary boundary is already having severe implications for global food security, including loss of soil fertility and insect-mediated pollination (Diaz et al. 2019).

Systems for the production and allocation of food are already enduring significant stress. The sources of stress include climate change, soil erosion, water scarcity, and phosphorus depletion. The natural resource base, arable land and freshwater upon which food production rely are being degraded. While global food productivity and production has increased dramatically over the past century to meet rising demand from an expanding global population and rising standard of living, these constraints and risks are increasing the vulnerability of our global food supply to rapid and global disruptions that could constitute global catastrophes (Baum et al. 2015)."

[4] "On average, for the total arable area in China, an estimated total amount of 2.2 kg P ha-1 was lost from crop and animal production systems. This rate of P loss is quite high compared with that estimated for many developed Western countries, for example, 0.4 kg ha-1 year-1 in Sweden and 0.5 kg ha-1 year-1 in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland". (Li et al, Past, present, and future use of phosphorus in Chinese agriculture and its influence on phosphorus losses p. 277-278)

[5] "The global phosphorus flows analysis through the food production and consumption system in Cordell et al. [1] found that 80% of the phosphorus in rock never reaches the food consumed by humans—it is lost at all key stages. During mining and fertilizer production, as much as 30–40% of phosphorus can be lost during extraction and primary processing [38], while much of the phosphorus entering livestock and cropping systems ends up in manure and soils respectively. Losses in the ‘post-harvest’ food system (i.e., between farm and fork) have been largely ignored until relatively recently. The globalized food commodity chain has resulted in more players, more processes, further distances and increased trade of commodities. Longer production chains in turn contribute to more food losses in the transport, production, storage and retail stages [54]. While Smil estimated global food losses in the commodity chain at approximately 50% [55], Lundqvist et al. [54] went on to estimate the embodied water in food losses." Cordell and White (2011), p. 2041

Comments7


Sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

I really like this, and would love to see more work in the "peak resource" field. Of all the doomsday scenarios that are...

  • Secular
  • Rarely discussed in EA
  • Often discussed outside of EA

...general risks from resource scarcity are the ones I feel most confused/concerned about. Is our farmland really deteriorating? Are we really running out of key minerals? Is biodiversity loss // mass extinction really going to destabilize human civilization

(That link is what pops up when I Google "biodiversity crisis" — haven't reviewed, just using it as an example of the kind of thing I hear often.)

I absolutely agree with you - in this regard, I wrote a post about energy depletion based on what some experts on limits to growth are saying, like Richard Heinberg, Arthur Keller, Nate Hagens, Dennis Meadows and the like.

You can check it here : The great energy descent (short version)

I spent some time on this, there are 3 posts + a summary (and I also made a 140 page document that goes in deeper detail about specific aspects).

Energy is especially important as it allows the extraction and production of everything else, so if it peaks the rest probably peaks too some time later (including phosphorus)... and I feel that EA really underestimated this aspect.

I agree overall, but Wikipedia says the USGS says that 223 million tons of phosphate rock are mined per year, so 260 years of reserves.

[anonymous]2
0
0

Hi dave, thanks for flagging this. yeah this is on p123 here. It seems like mine production is different to total consumption - we're mining more than we consume it would appear. From the point of view of running out of the resource, consumption rather than consumption is what matters, and USGS says  "World consumption of P2O5 contained in fertilizer and industrial uses was projected to increase to 49 million tons in 2024 from 47 million tons in 2020." 

P2O5 is 44% phosphorus by mass. Wiki:

Unprocessed phosphate rock has a concentration of 1.7-8.7% phosphorus by mass (4-20% phosphorus pentoxide).

In 2021, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) estimated that economically extractable phosphate rock reserves worldwide are 71 billion tons, while world mining production in 2020 was 223 million tons.[5] Assuming zero growth, the reserves would thus last for 260 years. 

So I think reserves are in phosphate rock, so you need to have production/consumption in terms of phosphate rock, not in terms of P2O5. That's why it's only 260 years. It would be very strange if the mining of something were five times as much as the consumption, especially over the longer term.

[anonymous]2
0
0

ah good catch - i will make an alteration to the post

The worry about peak phosphorous was always small but present in the back of my head. Reading this gave me one thing less to worry about and this is very sharable for future discussions. Thanks for the nice and concise analysis!

Curated and popular this week
 ·  · 20m read
 · 
Advanced AI could unlock an era of enlightened and competent government action. But without smart, active investment, we’ll squander that opportunity and barrel blindly into danger. Executive summary See also a summary on Twitter / X. The US federal government is falling behind the private sector on AI adoption. As AI improves, a growing gap would leave the government unable to effectively respond to AI-driven existential challenges and threaten the legitimacy of its democratic institutions. A dual imperative → Government adoption of AI can’t wait. Making steady progress is critical to: * Boost the government’s capacity to effectively respond to AI-driven existential challenges * Help democratic oversight keep up with the technological power of other groups * Defuse the risk of rushed AI adoption in a crisis → But hasty AI adoption could backfire. Without care, integration of AI could: * Be exploited, subverting independent government action * Lead to unsafe deployment of AI systems * Accelerate arms races or compress safety research timelines Summary of the recommendations 1. Work with the US federal government to help it effectively adopt AI Simplistic “pro-security” or “pro-speed” attitudes miss the point. Both are important — and many interventions would help with both. We should: * Invest in win-win measures that both facilitate adoption and reduce the risks involved, e.g.: * Build technical expertise within government (invest in AI and technical talent, ensure NIST is well resourced) * Streamline procurement processes for AI products and related tech (like cloud services) * Modernize the government’s digital infrastructure and data management practices * Prioritize high-leverage interventions that have strong adoption-boosting benefits with minor security costs or vice versa, e.g.: * On the security side: investing in cyber security, pre-deployment testing of AI in high-stakes areas, and advancing research on mitigating the ris
 ·  · 11m read
 · 
Our Mission: To build a multidisciplinary field around using technology—especially AI—to improve the lives of nonhumans now and in the future.  Overview Background This hybrid conference had nearly 550 participants and took place March 1-2, 2025 at UC Berkeley. It was organized by AI for Animals for $74k by volunteer core organizers Constance Li, Sankalpa Ghose, and Santeri Tani.  This conference has evolved since 2023: * The 1st conference mainly consisted of philosophers and was a single track lecture/panel. * The 2nd conference put all lectures on one day and followed it with 2 days of interactive unconference sessions happening in parallel and a week of in-person co-working. * This 3rd conference had a week of related satellite events, free shared accommodations for 50+ attendees, 2 days of parallel lectures/panels/unconferences, 80 unique sessions, of which 32 are available on Youtube, Swapcard to enable 1:1 connections, and a Slack community to continue conversations year round. We have been quickly expanding this conference in order to prepare those that are working toward the reduction of nonhuman suffering to adapt to the drastic and rapid changes that AI will bring.  Luckily, it seems like it has been working!  This year, many animal advocacy organizations attended (mostly smaller and younger ones) as well as newly formed groups focused on digital minds and funders who spanned both of these spaces. We also had more diversity of speakers and attendees which included economists, AI researchers, investors, tech companies, journalists, animal welfare researchers, and more. This was done through strategic targeted outreach and a bigger team of volunteers.  Outcomes On our feedback survey, which had 85 total responses (mainly from in-person attendees), people reported an average of 7 new connections (defined as someone they would feel comfortable reaching out to for a favor like reviewing a blog post) and of those new connections, an average of 3
 ·  · 15m read
 · 
In our recent strategy retreat, the GWWC Leadership Team recognised that by spreading our limited resources across too many projects, we are unable to deliver the level of excellence and impact that our mission demands. True to our value of being mission accountable, we've therefore made the difficult but necessary decision to discontinue a total of 10 initiatives. By focusing our energy on fewer, more strategically aligned initiatives, we think we’ll be more likely to ultimately achieve our Big Hairy Audacious Goal of 1 million pledgers donating $3B USD to high-impact charities annually. (See our 2025 strategy.) We’d like to be transparent about the choices we made, both to hold ourselves accountable and so other organisations can take the gaps we leave into account when planning their work. As such, this post aims to: * Inform the broader EA community about changes to projects & highlight opportunities to carry these projects forward * Provide timelines for project transitions * Explain our rationale for discontinuing certain initiatives What’s changing  We've identified 10 initiatives[1] to wind down or transition. These are: * GWWC Canada * Effective Altruism Australia funding partnership * GWWC Groups * Giving Games * Charity Elections * Effective Giving Meta evaluation and grantmaking * The Donor Lottery * Translations * Hosted Funds * New licensing of the GWWC brand  Each of these is detailed in the sections below, with timelines and transition plans where applicable. How this is relevant to you  We still believe in the impact potential of many of these projects. Our decision doesn’t necessarily reflect their lack of value, but rather our need to focus at this juncture of GWWC's development.  Thus, we are actively looking for organisations and individuals interested in taking on some of these projects. If that’s you, please do reach out: see each project's section for specific contact details. Thank you for your continued support as we
Relevant opportunities
14
Ryan Kidd
·