Dylan Matthews just posted a Vox article "If you’re such an effective altruist, how come you’re so rich?" which addresses critics of effective altruism's billionaires.
My TL;DR
- A lot of recent criticism of EA seems to come from the fact that it has a couple of billionaires now as supporters
- These billionaires however are some of the biggest donors to US candidates that would increase taxes on them
- Open support for raising taxes, e.g. Moskovitz tweeted the other day: "I’m for raising taxes and help elect Dems to do it"
- The broader EA community skews heavily left-of-center (typically supportive of higher taxes and social welfare)
- Effective altruism was founded explicitly on voluntary redistribution of income from people in high-income countries to low-income countries (e.g. Giving What We Can) and most of the communities founders give a significant portion of their incomes
- Given that the billionaires do exist, what else would you rather they spend money on?
That's just my TL;DR – feel free to put in your own summaries, comments and critiques below.
(I don't know if this is what you're getting at, but your comment prompted a bunch of thought in me.).
I find epistemic humility confusing.
I think I trust my own judgement about the proper marginal allocation of limited resources much more than I trust the judgement of the democratic process.
I also think I trust my morals about what's right to do much more than I trust the implicit morals implied by the American democratic process (and to be clear, America is a really good country! Other countries are usually worse, probably).
I think these are contentious claims in some domains. One person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens.
I guess my perspective re:
Is something like "welp, epistemic humility is hard but I sure still basically think that I trust my judgement more, ah well. So much the worse for the democratic process, I guess."
I can imagine on a surface level a reasonable person thinking "well the democracy process disagrees with me, so even though I spent several years carefully thinking about the proper allocation of limited resources, and I see clear causal reasons why people might be selfishly biased, and I see clear irrationalities on top of that, and even though the observed results of the democratic process is absolutely awful, the sheer number of disagreeing people is strong enough, and the track record of technocratic experts is bad enough, that basic epistemic humility tells me I ought to allocate resources by American people's vote over that of my own motivated judgement." But I can't viscerally imagine living life like that, and I don't know how to shape the full argument in a reasonable way.
I don't think there's an "agree to disagree" here, or at least not a clear one.
I think basically the synthesis view when "my own best judgement about what's right to do" disagrees with "the aggregated beliefs of the democratic process" has to be something like "update against both my own judgement, and also update against the American democratic process." I think how much relative weight you put on the two things is a hard question, but ultimately I place much more weight on my pre-existing views before factoring in this consideration, and relatively little weight on the American democratic process.
I do think "What will the average commonsensical American believe" is a part of my moral parliament for reasons of moral cooperation and humility. But I think it's a relatively small part, compared to other considerations.