Hide table of contents

Apply Now

Applications are now open for the third cycle of Oxford Biosecurity Group (OBG), and will close on 26th April 2024 at 23:59 anywhere on earth.

The application consists of a 30 minute application form, followed by a 20 minute on-demand interview. The projects are remote so people from all over the world can take part. An overview of the projects running this cycle are given later in this post. Applications are assessed on a rolling basis so submit as early as you can.

Apply here!

About OBG

OBG is a team of researchers dedicated to addressing issues related to biosecurity. OBG runs multiple 8-week, remote-first projects, and we partner with relevant organisations in the space to drive progress on pressing issues and to help individuals test their fit, grow their network, and upskill in biosecurity. Researchers work in small teams, led by a project lead, to conduct impactful research culminating in one or more final deliverables. A key way that these projects lead to real-world impact is through partnerships - outputs are shared with key stakeholders, and many projects are run in collaboration with an existing organisation.

For more details, see our website, or our 2023 retrospective. Our retrospective from our last project cycle (January-March 2024) will be released soon.

The Projects

We will be running seven projects between 6 May 2024 and 28 June 2024:

  1. Vital Industry Backup Plans
    1. Collaborator: Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disasters (ALLFED)
  2. Biosecurity Considerations of Controlled Human Infection Model Studies
    1. Collaborator: 1Day Sooner
  3. Antimicrobial Resistance Compliance Assessment
    1. Collaborator: Alliance for Reducing Microbial Resistance (ARMoR)
  4. Policy Idea Submission for Improving Respirator Stockpiles in the UK
    1. Collaborator: Technologies for Pandemic Defense
  5. Antimicrobial Resistance Modelling
    1. Background/rationale: ongoing project from the first two cycles of OBG, see presentation 1 and presentation 2
  6. Antimicrobial Surfaces for Pandemic Prevention
    1. Background/rationale: see forum post on antimicrobial surfaces for pandemic prevention
  7. Eliciting Biological Knowledge of AI Models
    1. Background/rationale: building on the results of a recent paper

Outputs from each project include a final presentation and a final report, and some projects have additional outputs including co-authoring a peer reviewed publication, and publishing a whitepaper.

For more details, see the Projects section of the OBG website. 

Who Are We Looking For?

Researchers

We are primarily recruiting for researchers for the above projects - see the project briefs for what you would be working on in a given project. 

Researchers spend 5-10 hours a week on their project. People from any country or experience level can apply, although we are primarily interested in recruiting undergraduates, postgraduates and early career professionals. We are looking for motivated people with strong communication skills, who are willing and able to work independently, learn quickly and respond to feedback. Existing knowledge of biosecurity is helpful but not necessary. Some projects have their own specific requirements. 

For more details on what we are looking for, see the OBG website, and the ‘Researcher Requirements’ section of each project brief. This is a volunteer role. 

Apply here by the end of 26th April 2024. 

Project Leads

We are actively recruiting for a co-lead for the “Antimicrobial Surfaces for Pandemic Prevention” project. If you are interested, please indicate this when you apply, or email contact@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com. This is a volunteer role. 

If you are interested in running a project in a future cycle of OBG, please indicate this when you apply, or fill in this interest form.  

Find Out More

To find out more details about OBG, please see our website

If you have any questions, please email us at contact@oxfordbiosecuritygroup.com.

Comments1


Sorted by Click to highlight new comments since:

Executive summary: The Oxford Biosecurity Group (OBG) is accepting applications for its third cycle of remote-first research projects focused on addressing biosecurity issues, and is looking to recruit both researchers and project leads.

Key points:

  1. The OBG is running seven research projects from May 6 to June 28, 2024, in collaboration with various organizations, on topics like vital industry backup plans, biosecurity considerations of controlled human infection model studies, antimicrobial resistance, respirator stockpiles, and eliciting biological knowledge of AI models.
  2. Researchers will spend 5-10 hours per week on their projects, and the OBG is primarily interested in recruiting undergraduates, postgraduates, and early career professionals with strong communication skills, independent work abilities, and a willingness to learn.
  3. The OBG is also actively recruiting for a co-lead for the "Antimicrobial Surfaces for Pandemic Prevention" project, and is open to receiving proposals for future project cycles.
  4. The application process consists of a 30-minute form and a 20-minute on-demand interview, with applications assessed on a rolling basis.
  5. Outputs from each project include a final presentation, a final report, and in some cases, a co-authored peer-reviewed publication or a whitepaper.
  6. The OBG aims to drive real-world impact through its partnerships with relevant organizations in the biosecurity space.

 

 

This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.

Curated and popular this week
 ·  · 38m read
 · 
In recent months, the CEOs of leading AI companies have grown increasingly confident about rapid progress: * OpenAI's Sam Altman: Shifted from saying in November "the rate of progress continues" to declaring in January "we are now confident we know how to build AGI" * Anthropic's Dario Amodei: Stated in January "I'm more confident than I've ever been that we're close to powerful capabilities... in the next 2-3 years" * Google DeepMind's Demis Hassabis: Changed from "as soon as 10 years" in autumn to "probably three to five years away" by January. What explains the shift? Is it just hype? Or could we really have Artificial General Intelligence (AGI)[1] by 2028? In this article, I look at what's driven recent progress, estimate how far those drivers can continue, and explain why they're likely to continue for at least four more years. In particular, while in 2024 progress in LLM chatbots seemed to slow, a new approach started to work: teaching the models to reason using reinforcement learning. In just a year, this let them surpass human PhDs at answering difficult scientific reasoning questions, and achieve expert-level performance on one-hour coding tasks. We don't know how capable AGI will become, but extrapolating the recent rate of progress suggests that, by 2028, we could reach AI models with beyond-human reasoning abilities, expert-level knowledge in every domain, and that can autonomously complete multi-week projects, and progress would likely continue from there.  On this set of software engineering & computer use tasks, in 2020 AI was only able to do tasks that would typically take a human expert a couple of seconds. By 2024, that had risen to almost an hour. If the trend continues, by 2028 it'll reach several weeks.  No longer mere chatbots, these 'agent' models might soon satisfy many people's definitions of AGI — roughly, AI systems that match human performance at most knowledge work (see definition in footnote). This means that, while the compa
 ·  · 4m read
 · 
SUMMARY:  ALLFED is launching an emergency appeal on the EA Forum due to a serious funding shortfall. Without new support, ALLFED will be forced to cut half our budget in the coming months, drastically reducing our capacity to help build global food system resilience for catastrophic scenarios like nuclear winter, a severe pandemic, or infrastructure breakdown. ALLFED is seeking $800,000 over the course of 2025 to sustain its team, continue policy-relevant research, and move forward with pilot projects that could save lives in a catastrophe. As funding priorities shift toward AI safety, we believe resilient food solutions remain a highly cost-effective way to protect the future. If you’re able to support or share this appeal, please visit allfed.info/donate. Donate to ALLFED FULL ARTICLE: I (David Denkenberger) am writing alongside two of my team-mates, as ALLFED’s co-founder, to ask for your support. This is the first time in Alliance to Feed the Earth in Disaster’s (ALLFED’s) 8 year existence that we have reached out on the EA Forum with a direct funding appeal outside of Marginal Funding Week/our annual updates. I am doing so because ALLFED’s funding situation is serious, and because so much of ALLFED’s progress to date has been made possible through the support, feedback, and collaboration of the EA community.  Read our funding appeal At ALLFED, we are deeply grateful to all our supporters, including the Survival and Flourishing Fund, which has provided the majority of our funding for years. At the end of 2024, we learned we would be receiving far less support than expected due to a shift in SFF’s strategic priorities toward AI safety. Without additional funding, ALLFED will need to shrink. I believe the marginal cost effectiveness for improving the future and saving lives of resilience is competitive with AI Safety, even if timelines are short, because of potential AI-induced catastrophes. That is why we are asking people to donate to this emergency appeal
 ·  · 1m read
 · 
We’ve written a new report on the threat of AI-enabled coups.  I think this is a very serious risk – comparable in importance to AI takeover but much more neglected.  In fact, AI-enabled coups and AI takeover have pretty similar threat models. To see this, here’s a very basic threat model for AI takeover: 1. Humanity develops superhuman AI 2. Superhuman AI is misaligned and power-seeking 3. Superhuman AI seizes power for itself And now here’s a closely analogous threat model for AI-enabled coups: 1. Humanity develops superhuman AI 2. Superhuman AI is controlled by a small group 3. Superhuman AI seizes power for the small group While the report focuses on the risk that someone seizes power over a country, I think that similar dynamics could allow someone to take over the world. In fact, if someone wanted to take over the world, their best strategy might well be to first stage an AI-enabled coup in the United States (or whichever country leads on superhuman AI), and then go from there to world domination. A single person taking over the world would be really bad. I’ve previously argued that it might even be worse than AI takeover. [1] The concrete threat models for AI-enabled coups that we discuss largely translate like-for-like over to the risk of AI takeover.[2] Similarly, there’s a lot of overlap in the mitigations that help with AI-enabled coups and AI takeover risk — e.g. alignment audits to ensure no human has made AI secretly loyal to them, transparency about AI capabilities, monitoring AI activities for suspicious behaviour, and infosecurity to prevent insiders from tampering with training.  If the world won't slow down AI development based on AI takeover risk (e.g. because there’s isn’t strong evidence for misalignment), then advocating for a slow down based on the risk of AI-enabled coups might be more convincing and achieve many of the same goals.  I really want to encourage readers — especially those at labs or governments — to do something