Edit: A previous version of this post contained significant errors, which was pointed out in the comments. I mark and correct them in this version, but I believe my point is largely unaffected.
I originally wanted to write a comment to the forum post CEA Disambiguation, which contains further context, but I believe this warrants its own post.
The Effective Ventures Foundation (formerly known as CEA) (I'll call them EVF) runs many projects, including 80.000 hours, Giving What We Can, Longview Philanthropy, EA Funds, and the Centre for Effective Altruism (CEA), which in turn seems to run this forum.
It is very strange to learn that these organizations are not independent from each other, and the EVF board can exert influence over each of them. I believe this structure was set up so the EVF board has central control over EA strategy.
Edit: I now believe that this structure was set up to share resources like ops and oversight. It's not clear to me that this is the correct choice. I do not believe that 80k, GWWC , EA Funds and CEA are sufficiently protected from interference or legal risks.
I think this is very bad. EVF can not be trusted to unbiasedly serve the EA community as a whole, it misleads donors, and it exposes effective altruism to unnecessary risks of contagion.
An example (misleading donors):
As "Giving What We Can", EVF currently recommends donations to a number of funds that are run by EVF:
- Longview Philanthropy: Longtermism Fund
- several Funds run by Effective Altruism Funds
Through the "EA Funds Longterm Future Fund", EVF has repeatedly paid out grants to itself, for example in July 2021 it paid itself $177,000 for its project "Centre for the Governance of AI".
Another example (biased advertising):
On https://www.effectivealtruism.org/, which serves as an introduction to EA, the EVF links to its own project 80000hours, but not to the competing Probably Good.In both examples, the obvious conflicts of interest are stated nowhere. Edit: On GWWC's page, The conflict of interest is stated somewhere, but I missed it when quickly looking for it.
What should we do?
I have not thought hard about this, but I have come up with a few obvious-sounding ideas. Please leave your thoughts in the comments!
This is what I think we should do:
- I think we should break up the EVF into independent projects, especially those that direct or receive funding. Until that happens, we should conceive of EVF as a single entity.
- We need to push for more transparency. EVF's "EA Funds"-branded funds publicly disclose their spending, which is commendable! EVF's "Longview Longtermism Fund" does not. (Edit: The Fund had previously credibly committed to releasing a spending report, which I missed)
- Funds should definitely disclose their conflicts of interest.
- We should champion community-run organizations like EA Germany e.V. or the Czech EA Association, and let them step into their natural role of representing the community. GWWC members should demand control over their institution.
- We should continue the debate about EA's governance norms. In order to de-risk the community and to represent our values, we should establish democratic, transparent and fair governance on all levels, including local groups.
- We probably should rethink supporting community leaders that consolidate their power instead of distributing it.
DFTBA,
Ludwig
PS: the same consideration applies for effektiveraltruismus.de, which is run by an EA donation platform, and not by EA Germany. (Edit: The page has now been transferred. Thanks!)
How about disclosure of more information about low-information grants to a jury of somewhat randomly selected donor-jurors who have signed an NDA but can vote on whether (1) the grant was reasonable (not a de novo reconsideration of the grant), and (2) the limitations on release of public information were reasonable under the circumstances? There would need to be an advanced commitment to publish those vote totals. The idea is that while there isn't disclosure to every donor, there is disclosure to a representative sample, and the votes provide a significant fraction of the information that direct disclosure would. Plus they would provide a check on fund managers making secret decisions without accountability to donors.
In many cases, the names or details of individuals should not be revealed to the jurors, and I think a jury would only be potentially appropriate and resource-effective for somewhat larger grants. I'd also let the grantee strike a few names off the draft juror list to avoid disclosure to anyone in their circle. It doesn't seem too time consuming, as the jury would presumably only be reading the information that would have otherwise been published (and perhaps with some redaction).
The "default giving option" point really depends for me on what percentage of grants (by dollar amount) are undisclosed.