Andy Weber was the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical & Biological Defense Programs from 2009 to 2014. He’s now a senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks. You might also know him from his appearance on the 80,000 Hours Podcast. Ask him anything![1]
He’ll try to answer some questions on Friday, September 29 (afternoon, Eastern Time), and might get to some earlier.
I (Lizka) am particularly excited that Andy can share his experience in nuclear (and other kinds of) threat reduction given that it is Petrov Day today.
Instructions and practical notes:
- Please post your questions as comments on this post.
- Posting questions earlier is better than later.
- If you have multiple questions, it might be better to post them separately.
- Feel free to upvote questions that others have posted, as it might help prioritize questions later.
Other context and topics that might be especially interesting to talk about:
- Risks of “tactical” nuclear weapons like the new sea-launched cruise missile (Reuters)
- Andy’s experience with Project Sapphire and the Nunn-Lugar program
- Andy’s thoughts on biosecurity and preventing bioweapons use
For those who want to explore more: The Dead Hand by David Hoffman might be interesting; Project Sapphire and some of the work against biological threats are captured in it.
- ^
He might not get to some questions, or be unable to answer some.
What role should international organizations and treaties play in regulating emerging biotechnologies to prevent their misuse for bioweapons development?
How can we strike a balance between scientific research and security concerns in the field of biotechnology to prevent the accidental or deliberate creation of bioweapons?
International organizations and treaties have a vital role in preventing BioWeapons development. We need to redouble our efforts to strengthen the BWC. There also needs to be stronger global governance to prevent accidents and misuse. Kazakhstan President Tokayev has proposed establishing and International Biosafety Agency. This and other similar concepts to strengthen biosecurity should be actively promoted.
We definitely need to do more on the security side of this equation.