Wild animals and weirdness
Section 4 ("The weirdest stuff will put people off the moderate stuff") argues that perceptions of the weirdness of a given cause or intervention "create blocks to uptake and prevents people from supporting the more moderate parts of the same movement."
Insofar as this is true, it's important to know the degrees of perceived weirdness. To my pleasant surprise, I've found that wild animal welfare seems much less weird to most people than it does to most EAs. This is based on my experience working at Wild Animal Initiative for the last five years, hearing my colleagues' reports of their conversations with people (primarily scientists), and generally talking about it at every chance I get (both with EAs and non-EAs).
Apologies for the forthcoming generalizations about EAs. I'm trying to describe general patterns; I'm not trying to flatten everyone into one caricature.
How the idea is introduced
In my experience, EAs often explain wild animal welfare along these lines: "Nature is really brutal. The animals with the worst lives are the most numerous. We should destroy habitat or eliminate predators."
In contrast, my colleagues and I have settled on an approach that's closer to this: "You seem like you care about animals. So do we. People talk a lot about human harms to animals, but there's so much we don't know about naturally occurring harms. We think it would be good to protect wild animals from things like disease or starvation if we could. But ecosystems are really complicated, so that's why we're focused on doing research first."
It turns out most people respond really well to that. In fact, our biggest communication challenge is not people thinking we're too weird, but rather people not thinking we're weird enough. That is, "reducing wild animal suffering" sounds a lot like "protecting endangered species." They get the overlap quickly; it's the differences that take longer to explain.
What things are discussed
In my experience, most EA discussions of wild animal welfare focus on extreme thought experiments, extreme interventions, and core philosophical principles. My hypothesis is that that's largely because of a temperamental inclination toward abstraction and consistency, which is why many of us (including me) like to steer conversations toward areas of deepest disagreement or highest uncertainty.
Turns out there's no rule that says you have to single out whatever someone loves most and declare it must be wiped from this earth. The thought experiments and zany interventions are also of only limited usefulness, because they're almost completely untethered from the considerations that will guide the next steps of research and movement-building.
So we and other researchers in the field mostly discuss things that are both more palatable and more achievable in the near term (or at least representative of how we might do things in the near term, which "feeding lions cultivated meat via drones" is not): vaccination against diseases, contraception to prevent starvation, promoting habitats/land uses that host populations with higher total welfare than the alternatives, reducing sources of stress, etc.
Baseline attitudes toward nature
I think most people in the industrialized West like wildlife. It seems like the default is people seeing themselves on the same side as animals (e.g., happy to see them at all, sad to see them suffer), and exceptions come when people come into direct conflict with animals (urban pest species, predators of livestock, etc.). Crucially, these attitudes seem to be not just about preferences ("I like animals"), but also tied into identity at a very basic, nonpartisan level: "I'm the kind of person who appreciates wildlife," "Nice people are nice to animals," etc. I've singled out "animals" here, but in reality these preferences and identities tend to bundle animals and nature into one, and "nature" is what's mentioned more often: "Nature is beautiful," "I'm the kind of person who respects nature," etc.
Before I got involved in EA, I had only ever met a handful of people who disliked nature. (They were all kids -- I was also a kid -- who grew up in densely urban areas, and their main issue seemed to be with bugs, particularly mosquitoes.) Now that I'm deep in the EA bubble and talking about nature a lot, I've met tons of EAs who say they've always disliked nature: they thought it was obviously cruel, harsh, unwelcoming, gross, etc. (I even met one person who said they didn't even understand why anyone thought natural vistas looked beautiful until a psychedelic experience gave them that experience for the first time.) Either I grew up super sheltered (likely true), or EA has a way of attracting weirdos (definitely true -- again, I offer myself as evidence).
Another thing that causes many EAs to underestimate how willing -- how excited -- most people are to help wildlife is their experiences advocating for farmed animals. Most people have very different attitudes toward farmed animals than wild animals, and they have a vested interest in not changing what they eat or how our economy works. As Henry points out, mocking vegans is a cultural norm, and sometimes even part of people's identities. Fortunately, when asked to help wild animals, people don't interpret that as an attack on their integrity or their lifestyle, so they don't have the same defensive reaction.
Conclusion
That was wordier than I expected. All I really wanted to say is I know we can make "mass vaccination eco-engineering projects to limit unnecessary wild animal suffering from disease" sound pretty weird, but most people think "protecting wildlife from diseases" sounds like a pretty good idea. There are still lots of challenges to people fully understanding, accepting, and improving wild animal welfare, but we shouldn't make those challenges out to be worse than they are.
This post is mostly about how animal welfare is less popular than global health but I don't really see the tie-in for how this (probably correct) claim translates to it being less effective. Taking the first argument at face value, that some people won't like being in some ways forced to pay more or change their habits, does not seem to translate to "it is not cost effective to do successfully force them (and one hopes eventually change their hearts and minds) anyway." This was precisely the case for a lot of social movements (abolition, women's suffrage, civil rights, worker's rights, the environmental movement, etc.) but all these movements were to various degrees successful.
It seems to me that in order for any of these popularity based arguments to hold water, you need a follow-on of "and therefore it is not cost effective to invest in them, and here is the evidence." However, I think we have a lot of evidence for cost-effectiveness in investing animal interventions. See cage-free egg campaigns for example. I similarly don't understand the relevance of other popularity-based concerns, such as being accused of being culturally insensitive. What is the implication for effectiveness if such accusations are made? Why does that matter?
Keeping the public on side is actually quite important for getting things done.
Backlash against the thing you’re trying to promote blows out costs, making the plan less cost-effective
50% of people are women so I think women’s suffrage had a pretty strong support base before it was made law. Similar story for your other examples I think: build support, then laws. Abolition seems like an example of where a counter-movement blew out the cost of change a lot.
Seems to me that the effectiveness costs of public support are already baked into existing effectiveness estimates. It also seems to me that the fact that animal welfare is comparatively unpopular means that it is more neglected and therefore has more low-hanging fruit.
I don't think any of the popularity-based arguments really support the claim that there is going to be a large backlash that has not yet manifested. I agree that a world where we knew everyone would be 100 percent behind the idea of improving welfare but for some reason hadn't made it happen out of inertia would make animal welfare interventions even more cost effective. However, I don't think this means that we should favor global health and development over animal welfare any more than the possibility that people might resent helping the poor people in poor countries over poor people in our own countries means we should focus more on helping the domestic poor out of fear of backlash.
You can’t bake-in something as unpredictable as how movements and counter-movements evolve and interact.
We need to be more open to uncertainty and consider unexpected ways in which our best laid plans may go astray. Animal Welfare is rife with these uncertainties.
I'm not super knowledgeable about women's suffrage, but
I could similarly say ">99.999% of animals are nonhumans, so nonhuman animal welfare has an extremely large support base." But that's not the relevant support base for the discussion at hand.
I didn't say universal or 50% support. Many women were against, many men were for. My point is that it had a stronger support base than shrimp welfare before we tried to regulate it.
The idea that you can go regulating without considering public support/resistance is silly
Sorry you're right, you didn't say this -- I misread that part of your comment.
I still think your framing misses something important: the logic "50% of people are women so I think women’s suffrage had a pretty strong support base" applies at all points in time, so it doesn't explain why suffrage was so unpopular for so long. Or to put it another way, for some reason the popularity and political influence of the suffrage movement increased dramatically without the percentage of women increasing, so I'm not sure the percentage of people who are women is relevant in the way you're implying.
On the other hand I didn't say this! The degree of public support is certainly relevant. But I'm not sure what your practical takeaway or recommendation is in the case of an unpopular movement.
For example you point out abolition as an example where resistance caused massive additional costs (including the Civil War in the US). I could see points 1, 3, 7, and possibly 8 all being part of a "Ways I see the Quaker shift to abolitionism backfiring" post. They could indeed be fair points that Quakers / other abolitionists should have considered, in some way -- but I'm not sure what that post would have actually wanted abolitionists to do differently, and I'm not sure what your post wants EAs to do differently.
Maybe you just intend to be pointing out possible problems, without concluding one way or another whether the GH -> AW shift is overall good or bad. But I get a strong sense from reading it that you think it's overall bad, and if that's the case I don't know what the practical upshots are.