I've found the following abstract frame/set of heuristics useful for thinking about how we can try to affect (or predict) the long-term future:
“How do we want to spend our precision/reach points? And can we spend them more wisely?”
[Meta: This is a rough, abstract, and pretty rambly note with assorted links; I’m just trying to pull some stuff out and synthesize it in a way I can more easily reference later (hoping to train habits along these lines). I don't think the ideas here are novel, and honestly I'm not sure who'd find this useful/interesting. (I might also keep editing it as I go.]
An underlying POV here is that (a) scope and (b) precision are in tension. (Alts: (a) "ambition / breadth / reach / ...” — vs — (b) “predictability / fidelity / robustness / ...”). You can aim at something specific and nearby [high precision, limited reach] or at something larger and farther away, fuzzier [low precision, broad reach]. And if you care about the kind of effect you’re having (you want to make X happen, not just looking for influence ~for influence’s sake), this matters a bunch.
Importantly, I think there are “architectural” features of the world/reality[1] that can ease this tension somewhat if they're used properly; if you channel your effort through them, you can transmit an intervention without it dissipating (or getting warped) as much as it otherwise would. Any channels like this will still be leaky (and they’re limited), but this sort of “structure” seems like the main thing to look for if you’re hoping to think about or improve the long-term future.
(See a related sketch diagram here. I also often picture something like: “what levers could reach across a paradigm shift?” (or: what features are invariant in relevant ways?))
Some examples / thinking this through a bit:
- Trying to organize or steer a social movement (/big group of people) might extend your reach, but you generally sacrifice precision/fidelity by doing that; the group might get derailed, the ideas might mutate (or just get blurrier / diluted), etc.[2]
- Sometimes people build unusually stable social structures (i.e. ones that don’t change that much).[3] Maybe some religious orders are like this. I think these often exploit a pattern like “encouraging strong+loud commitment to various kinds of norms is self-reinforcing”.
- (The broader pattern here might be about creating a thing that can maintain homeostasis, and the trick is finding healthy versions/.)
- (On that note, questions like “Where do (did?) stable, cooperative institutions come from?” seem really useful to explore.)
- Betting on long-lasting institutions could let you extend your reach by leveraging the likely persistent role(?)/relative stability of those institutions
- ...but you’re still paying a scope and/or precision/fidelity cost (there are only particular ways that you can shape an institution’s behavior, in some scenarios an institution that looks relevant won’t matter at all for what you care about, it might just get in the way, etc.)
- E.g. trying improve a government body’s decision-making with the hope that it’ll help with AI governance
- Relatedly, particular high-plasticity moments (or catalyzing/disruptive events) might matter a lot, and we might be able to predict some of them+what matters, and be better prepared for them.
- E.g. maybe a bunch of countries/actors will come together and write something like a new declaration of human rights. Or something may act as a “warning shot”, and for some (brief?) time high-inertia things like what the public cares about or the structure of a major institution might become very malleable.
- This is significant for how I think about AI. (See “the crucible” or “AI as a constitutional moment.”[4])
- The other side of high-plasticity moments is the possibility of crystallization/lock-ins/strong basins. (See dynamism, value lock-in, ...)
- Other high-level asymmetries can also function as “structure” in this way:
- E.g. perhaps truth or certain virtues are self-reinforcing and generally beneficial, or tend to good equilibria; we can use this kind of thing to ~bootstrap
- See “Good governance escape velocity”, “promoting x x-ingly”, aligning to virtues... (stuff like superrationality / meta cooperative principles?)
- Or a different pattern/feature: if we’re in some not-too-stable social equilibrium (e.g. many people afraid of expressing a view), then acting (as an individual) in a true-to-yourself way can break that equilibrium — see “being a fixed point”.
- (A more zoomed out “pattern” here might just be that “good things are good”)
- E.g. perhaps truth or certain virtues are self-reinforcing and generally beneficial, or tend to good equilibria; we can use this kind of thing to ~bootstrap
And so the point is that some projects find significantly “smarter” paths through this <reach (things have a small effect) vs precision (things don't have the effect you want)> space, piggybacking on features of reality that are more stable and predictably causally linked. I.e. it helps to orient to ~casual chokepoints that are close enough to predict/act on (we know stuff about them, we can use them as operational targets -- they’re on the right horizon/within reach), but causally upstream of enough important stuff for improvements to propagate down and make a big (positive!) difference.
I wrote most of this when we were working on the “First type of transformative AI?” post (here's the Forum version); I’d found it very natural to translate some of that into the above frame.
Something like:
-> People often zero in on something like the "boss battle" AI challenge (e.g. ~ASI), but — even assuming that's the main threat — aiming directly for dealing with later-stage AI transformations seems like it's often an inefficient way of spending your precision/reach points (relative to channeling your effort through shaping earlier AI impacts).
I.e. (barring something like the "silent-IE" trajectory here) —
If AI will have transformed a bunch of other stuff by the time the issue shows up, the world you're preparing for will be radically different than the one you're used to (and harder to predict).
- If you try to do something specific/robust/..., there's a greater chance that your work will be irrelevant (or it'll only help with the small slice of things/scenarios you can predict more specifically); your scope is very narrow.
- If you do something much more ambitious, you really need to hope that the intervention is actually helpful instead of getting warped / distracted along the way (moves like trying to start a movement, which could end up harmful or pushing for things that aren't that useful, or e.g. trying to lock in a particular power structure or set of norms before knowing more about what's going on).
(This is basically just the usual pattern. You can maybe think of it as having "how much AI has changed the world" on the X-axis instead of "time into the future")
Meanwhile, earlier-in-the-queue AI impacts might provide us with really good “channels”/levers (for affecting the long-term):
- They're "within reach" — we know more about how AI is changing things now, have more access/ability to change things (plus this is getting less attention)
- In some cases I think shaping how this plays out could be a reasonably good way to faithfully “transmit” the effects of our effort
- E.g. because we have reason to believe that they’re causally connected to later shifts in particular ways (e.g. the good kind of positive feedback loop on epistemics/coordination; if this change goes better, we’ll be nontrivially better set up for dealing with AI takeover threats / power concentration issues, ...)
- (For epistemics/coordination effects I also think they'd help quite a bit with other potential challenges -- it's a bit like "general capacity for sense" in my mind. But I expect this "causal connection" step is really tricky more generally and maybe voids some of this frame? )
- I think we can point to some that matter a lot; orienting to them doesn't limit the scope too much (even if they’re not “the big one”);
- (Even if you only consider the effects on AI-disempowerment threats, I think shaping how e.g. AI gets deployed in information ecosystems could matter a lot.)
To be clear: “how earlier AI impacts go” definitely isn't the only kind of channel/ causal chokepoint we can use to try to improve “how AI goes” or to help with "boss battles" etc. E.g.
- The nature of advanced AI systems is obviously critical and seems (somewhat) predictably affectable; on some views shaping something like ASI is “within reach” (i.e. you should just directly work on something like prosaic superhuman-AI-alignment), or maybe you should work on bootstrapping to safely automated alignment (/virtuous cycles on this front), or maybe the internal processes of the major AI companies are the key thing, and so on.
- I also think the order of different AI capabilities could matter a lot, and we might have some “differential AI development” opportunities.
- ...
Still, I continue to think that people focus too much on something like the "silent-IE" path here, and too little on “in which ways could AI massively change things early — before disempowerment-threatening-ASI — and can we improve how that goes?”
(At the time I also wrote the following (still true): Having written that, I find myself wanting to look closer at the “architecture” of potential early transformations; what are important early transformations that give us some predictability channel? Etc.)
Anyway, I like this as a “find a route to impact/predictability that makes use of more robust/persistent features” prompt. In my mind it’s also quite related to how I would prefer people orient to speculative BOTECs; find “features” related to the question you care about that are more stable (including inputs that are more grounded and a way to put them together that you trust). (Related section of my “ITN 201” post. See also this note on using simpler models.)
I think similar dynamics apply in a bunch of other places, too.[5]
== Some only-very-marginally-relevant images ==
An old sketch illustrating a sort of related idea (trying to see further-out "beacons" is useful, but it's also useful to have a "nearer" target that you can actually visualize, even if it's flawed, which was a major motivation for the design sketches work):
Another rough diagram (from over a year ago, now, I think):
And just for fun I'll add a couple other sketches in this footnote (people told me around when I made them that they were largely incomprehensible, IIRC).[6]
- ^
- ^
People often have quite a bit of choice in how to navigate the ~precision-breadth tradeoff, though, I think. See e.g. The fidelity model of spreading ideas
- ^
It's probably more accurate to say "...sometimes unusually stable social structures arise", actually.
My model is that they're often not really designed by anyone.
Similarly I think “leaders” of broad social structures (including e.g. revolutions) are often "selected in" or "leading the parade" rather than doing something like directing. (A check with Claude suggests that original main leaders/planners of successful revolutions usually did not hold power for at least 5 years [5-7/29 cases, apparently], and ~rarely achieved their stated political goals.)
Semi-related: (social) system dynamics are quite counterintuitive, “places to intervene in a system.”
- ^
I also remember appreciating Acemoglu’s Institutions, Technology and Prosperity
- ^
Related shortform by my brother (bold mine):
[...] This doesn't mean we need to give up, or only work on unambitious, practical applications. But it does mean that we have to admit that things can be useful to work on in expectation before we have a "complete story for how they save the world".
Note that what is being advocated here is not an "anything goes" mentality. I certainly think that AI safety research can be too abstract, too removed from any realistic application in any world. But there is a large spectrum of possibilities between "fully plan how you will solve a complex logic game before trying anything" and "make random jerky moves because they 'feel right'".
I'm writing this in response to Adam Jones' article on AI safety content.. I like a lot of the suggestions. But I think the section on alignment plans suffers from the "axe" fallacy that I claim is somewhat endemic here. Here's the relevant quote:
> For the last few weeks, I’ve been working on trying to find plans for AI safety. They should cover the whole problem, including the major hurdles after intent alignment. Unfortunately, this has not gone well - my rough conclusion is that there aren’t any very clear and well publicised plans (or even very plausible stories) for making this go well. (More context on some of this work can be found in BlueDot Impact’s AI safety strategist job posting). (emphasis mine).
I strongly disagree with this being a good thing to do!
We're not going to have a good, end-to-end plan about how to save the world from AGI. Even now, with ever more impressive and scary AIs becoming a comonplace, we have very little idea about what AGI will look like, what kinds of misalignment it will have, where the hard bits of checking it for intent and value alignment will be. Trying to make extensive end-to-end plans can be useful, but can also lead to a strong streetlight effect: we'll be overcommitting to current understanding, current frames of thought (in an alignment community that is growing and integrating new ideas with an exponential rate that can be factored in months, not years).
Don't get me wrong. I think it's valuable to try to plan things where our current understanding is likely to at least partially persist: how AI will interface with government, general questions of scaling and rough models of future development. But we should also understand that our map has lots of blanks, especially when we get down to thinking about what we will understand in the future. [...]
A few other links I'd dumped in a doc with this note:
John Wentworth’s writing on gears-level models (e.g. “...are capital investments”).
Eliezer:
- The Outside View's Domain ("...does not inspire in me any confidence that the Outside View can be applied across processes with greatly different internal causal structures, like life-and-death versus sleeping-and-waking. ..." ... "when you deal with attempted analogies across structually different processes, perhaps unique or poorly understood, then things which are similar in some surface respects are often different in other respects. And the sign of this domain is that when people try to reason by similarity, it is not at all clear what is similar to what, or which surface resemblances they should focus upon as opposed to others.")
- Underconstrained Abstractions ("...The further away you get from highly regular things like atoms, and the closer you get to surface phenomena that are the final products of many moving parts, the more history underconstrains the abstractions that you use. This is part of what makes futurism difficult. ")
- ^
From "First type of TAI?" again, a whacky schematic:
Whacky illustration:













Benjamin Lay — "Quaker Comet", early (radical) abolitionist, general "moral weirdo" — died on this day 267 years ago.
I shared a post about him a little while back, and still think of February 8 as "Benjamin Lay Day".
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Around the same time I also made two paintings inspired by his life/work, which I figured I'd share now. One is an icon-style-inspired image based on a portrait of him[1]:
The second is based on a print depicting the floor plan of an infamous slave ship (Brooks). The print was used by abolitionists (mainly(?) the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade) to help communicate the horror of the trade.
I found it useful to paint it (and appreciate having it around today). But I imagine that not everyone might want to see it, so I'll skip a few lines here in case you expanded this quick take and decide you want to scroll past/collapse it instead.
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The original (see post) was commissioned by Deborah Read as a gift for her husband Benjamin Franklin, who also Benjamin Lay’s friend.
Wow, I've never seen that print before. That is absolutely horrifying. I feel kind of sick looking at it. What a stark reminder of the costs of getting morality wrong. Thank you for painting it, for sharing it, and for the reminder of this day.
Thank you for reminding about this remarkable person. I'll add him to my personal inspirational list of Humanity's Best People