I'm posting this to tie in with the Forum's Draft Amnesty Week (March 11-17) plans, but it is also a question of more general interest. The last time this question was posted, it got some great responses.
This post is a companion post for What posts are you thinking about writing?
When answering in this thread, I suggest putting each idea in a different answer, so that comment threads don't get too confusing.
If you think someone has already written the answer to a user's question, consider lending a hand and linking it in the comments.
A few suggestions for possible answers:
- A question you would like someone to answer: “How, historically, did AI safety become an EA cause area?”
- A type of experience you would like to hear about: “I’d love to hear about the experience of moving from consulting into biosecurity policy. Does anyone know anyone like this who might want to write about their experience?”
If you find yourself with loads of ideas, consider writing a full "posts I would like someone to write" post.
Draft Amnesty Week
If you see a post idea here which you think you might be positioned to answer, Draft Amnesty Week (March 11-17) might be a great time to post it. In Draft Amnesty Week, your posts don't have to be fully thought through, or even fully drafted. Bullet-points and missing sections are allowed, so you can have a lower bar for posting.
Hi, sorry if I'm a bit late here, and I don't want to be repeating myself too much, but since I feel it was not properly understood, one of the main points I originally made in this thread and I want to really hit home is that happiness as measured while in a state of happiness cannot be compared in any way to non-existence as "measured" in a state of non-existence, since we obviously cannot perceive sensations (or literally anything) when dead/not in existence. So the common intuition that happiness is preferable to non-existence is based upon our shallow understanding of what it is to "be" dead/non-existant, but from a rational point of view this idea simply does not hold. If I was being tortured with no way out, I would certainly want to die as quickly as I could, however when I imagine death in that moment, I am imagining (while in the state of suffering, and not in the "state" of death) a cessation of that suffering. However, to experience such a cessation I must be able to experience something to which I can compare against said experience of suffering. So technically speaking it doesn't make any sense at all to say that happiness/suffering is better than non-existence as measured in the respective states of happiness/suffering and death/non-existence. It's
And it's not like death/non-existence is neutral in this case. If you picture a scale, with positive experiences (e.g. happiness/satisfaction) in the positive direction and negative experiences (e.g. pain/suffering) in the negative direction, death does NOT appear at 0 since what we are measuring is the perceived value of the experiences. Put another way in terms of utility functions, if someone has a utility function at some value, and then they die, rather than immediately going to zero, their utility function immediately ceases to exist, as a utility function must belong to someone.
Also this idea of mine is somewhat new to me (a few months old maybe), so I haven't thought through many implications and edge-cases too thoroughly (yet). However this idea, however difficult for me to wrestle with, is something which I find myself simply unable to reason out of.