You can now import posts directly from Google docs Plus, internal links to headers[1] will now be mapped over correctly. To import a doc, make sure it is public or shared with "eaforum.posts@gmail.com"[2], then use the widget on the new/edit post page: Importing a doc will create a new (permanently saved) version of the post, but will not publish it, so it's safe to import updates into posts that are already published. You will need to click the "Publish Changes" button to update the live post. Everything that previously worked on copy-paste[3] will also work when importing, with the addition of internal links to headers (which only work when importing). There are still a few things that are known not to work: * Nested bullet points (these are working now) * Cropped images get uncropped * Bullet points in footnotes (these will become separate un-bulleted lines) * Blockquotes (there isn't a direct analog of this in Google docs unfortunately) There might be other issues that we don't know about. Please report any bugs or give any other feedback by replying to this quick take, you can also contact us in the usual ways. Appendix: Version history There are some minor improvements to the version history editor[4] that come along with this update: * You can load a version into the post editor without updating the live post, previously you could only hard-restore versions * The version that is live[5] on the post is shown in bold Here's what it would look like just after you import a Google doc, but before you publish the changes. Note that the latest version isn't bold, indicating that it is not showing publicly: 1. ^ Previously the link would take you back to the original doc, now it will take you to the header within the Forum post as you would expect. Internal links to bookmarks (where you link to a specific text selection) are also partially supported, although the link will only go to the paragraph the text selection is in 2. ^ Sharing with this email address means that anyone can access the contents of your doc if they have the url, because they could go to the new post page and import it. It does mean they can't access the comments at least 3. ^ I'm not sure how widespread this knowledge is, but previously the best way to copy from a Google doc was to first "Publish to the web" and then copy-paste from this published version. In particular this handles footnotes and tables, whereas pasting directly from a regular doc doesn't. The new importing feature should be equal to this publish-to-web copy-pasting, so will handle footnotes, tables, images etc. And then it additionally supports internal links 4. ^ Accessed via the "Version history" button in the post editor 5. ^ For most intents and purposes you can think of "live" as meaning "showing publicly". There is a bit of a sharp corner in this definition, in that the post as a whole can still be a draft. To spell this out: There can be many different versions of a post body, only one of these is attached to the post, this is the "live" version. This live version is what shows on the non-editing view of the post. Independently of this, the post as a whole can be a draft or published.

David Nash's Monthly Overload of Effective Altruism seems highly underrated, and you should most probably give it a follow. I don't think any other newsletter captures and highlights EA's cause-neutral impartial beneficence better than the Monthly Overload of EA. For example, this month's newsletter has updates about Conferences, Virtual Events, Meta-EA, Effective Giving, Global Health and Development, Careers, Animal Welfare, Organization updates, Grants, Biosecurity, Emissions & CO2 Removal, Environment, AI Safety, AI Governance, AI in China, Improving Institutions, Progress, Innovation & Metascience, Longtermism, Forecasting, Miscellaneous causes and links, Stories & EA Around the World, Good News, and more. Compiling all this must be hard work! Until September 2022, the monthly overloads were also posted on the Forum and received higher engagement than the Substack. I find the posts super informative, so I am giving the newsletter a shout-out and putting it back on everyone's radar!

The government's sentencing memorandum for SBF is here; it is seeking a sentence of 40-50 years. As typical for DOJ in high-profile cases, it is well-written and well-done. I'm not just saying that because it makes many of the same points I identified in my earlier writeup of SBF's memorandum. E.g., p. 8 ("doubling down" rather than walking away from the fraud); p. 43 ("paid in full" claim is highly misleading) [page cites to numbers at bottom of page, not to PDF page #]. EA-adjacent material: There's a snarky reference to SBF's charitable donations "(for which he still takes credit)" (p. 2) in the intro, and the expected hammering of SBF's memo for taking credit for attempting to take credit for donations paid with customer money (p. 95). There's a reference to SBF's "idiosyncratic . . . beliefs around altruism, utilitarianism, and expected value" (pp. 88-89). This leads to the one surprise theme (for me): the need to incapacitate SBF from committing additional crimes (pp. 87, 90). Per the feds, "the defendant believed and appears still to believe that it is rational and necessary for him to take great risks including imposing those risks on others, if he determines that it will serve what he personally deems a worthy project or goal," which contributes to his future dangerousness (p. 89). For predictors: Looking at sentences where the loss was > $100MM and the method was Ponzi/misappropriation/embezzlement, there's a 20-year, two 30-years, a bunch of 40-years, three 50-years, and three 100+-years (pp. 96-97). Interesting item: The government has gotten about $3.45MM back from political orgs, and the estate has gotten back ~$280K (pp. 108-09). The proposed forfeiture order lists recipients, and seems to tell us which ones returned monies to the government (Proposed Forfeiture Order, pp. 24-43). Life Pro Tip: If you are arrested by the feds, do not subsequently write things in Google Docs that you don't want the feds to bring up at your sentencing. Jotting down the idea that "SBF died for our sins" as some sort of PR idea (p. 88; source here) is particularly ill-advised.  My Take: In Judge Kaplan's shoes, I would probably sentence at the high end of the government's proposed range. Where the actual loss will likely be several billion, and the loss would have been even greater under many circumstances, I don't think a consequence of less than two decades' actual time in prison would provide adequate general deterrence -- even where the balance of other factors was significantly mitigating. That would imply a sentence of ~25 years after a prompt guilty plea. Backsolving, that gets us a sentence of ~35 years without credit for a guilty plea. But the balance of other factors is aggravating, not mitigating. Stealing from lots of ordinary people is worse than stealing from sophisticated investors. Outright stealing by someone in a fiduciary role is worse than accounting fraud to manipulate stock prices. We also need to adjust upward for SBF's post-arrest conduct, including trying to hide money from the bankruptcy process, multiple attempts at witness tampering, and perjury on the stand. Stacking those factors would probably take me over 50 years, but like the government I don't think a likely-death-in-prison sentence is necessary here.

SBF's sentencing memorandum is here. On the first page of the intro, we get some quotes about SBF's philanthropy. On the next, we are told he "lived a very modest life" and that any reports of extravagance are fabrications. [N.B.: All page citations are to the typed numbers at the bottom, not to the PDF page number.]  For the forecasters: based on Guidelines calculations in the pre-sentence report (PSR) by Probation, the Guidelines range is 110 years (would be life, but is capped at the statutory max). Probation recommended 100 years. PSRs are sealed, so we'll never see the full rationale on that. The average fraud defendant with a maxed-out offense level, no criminal history, and no special cooperation credit receives a sentence of 283 months. The first part of the memo is about the (now advisory) Sentencing Guidelines used in federal court. The major argument is that there should be no upward adjustment for loss because everyone is probably getting all their money back. Courts have traditionally looked at the greater of actual or "intended" loss, but the memo argues that isn't correct after a recent Supreme Court decision.  As a factual matter, I'm skeptical that the actual loss is $0, especially where much of the improvement is due to increases in the crypto market that customers would have otherwise benefitted from directly. Plus everyone getting money back (including investors who were defrauded) is far from a certain outcome, the appellate courts have been deferential to best-guess loss calculations, and the final Guidelines range would not materially change if the loss amount were (say) $25MM. If I'm the district judge here, I'd probably include some specific statements and findings in my sentencing monologue in an attempt to insulate this issue from appeal. Such as: I'd impose the same sentence no matter what the Guidelines said, because $0 dramatically understates the offense severity and $10B overstates it. There are a few places in which the argument ventures into tone-deaf waters. The argument that SBF wasn't in a position of public or private trust (p. 25-26) seems awfully weak and ill-advised to my eyes. The discussion of possible equity-holder losses (pp. 20-21) also strikes me as dismissive at points. No, equity holders don't get a money-back guarantee, but they are entitled to not be lied to when deciding where to invest. The second half involves a discussion of the so-called 3553 factors that a court must consider in determining a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary. Pages 41-42 discuss Peter Singer and earning to give, while pages 46-50 continue on about SBF's philanthropy (including a specific reference to GWWC and link to the pledger list on page 46).  Throughout the memo, the defense asserts that FTX was different from various other schemes that were fraudulent from day one (e.g., p. 56). My understanding is that the misuse of customer funds started pretty early in FTX's history, so I don't give this much weight. The memo asserts that SBF was less culpable than various comparators, ranging from Madoff himself (150 years) to Elizabeth Holmes (135 months) (pp. 73-80). The bottom-line request is for a sentence of 63-78 months, which is the Guidelines range if one accepts the loss amount as $0 (p. 89). There are 29 letters in SBF's support by family members, his psychiatrist, Ross Rheingans-Yoo, Kat Woods, and a bunch of names I don't recognize. [Caution: The remainder of this post contains more opinion-laden commentary than what has preceded it!] I generally find the 3553 discussion unpersuasive. The section on "remorse" (pp. 55-56) rings hollow to me, although this is an unavoidable consequence of SBF's trial litigation choices. There is "remorse" that people were injured and impliedly that SBF made various errors in judgment, but there isn't any acknowledgment of wrongdoing. One sentence of note to this audience: "Sam is simply devastated that the advice, mentorship, and funding that he has given to the animal welfare, global poverty, and pandemic prevention movements does not begin to counteract the damage done to them by virtue of their association with him." (p. 55).  I find the discussion of the FTX Foundation to be jarring, such as "Ultimately, the FTX Foundation donated roughly $150 million to charities working on issues such as pandemic prevention, animal welfare, and funding anti-malarial mosquito netting in Africa." (p. 57). Attempting to take credit for sending some of the money you took from customers to charity takes a lot of nerve!  Although the memo asserts that SBF's neurodiversity makes him "uniquely vulnerable" in prison (p. 58), the unfortunate truth is that many convicted criminals have characteristics that make successfully adapting to prison life more difficult than for the average person (e.g., severe mental illness, unusually low intelligence). So I'm not convinced by the memo that he would face an atypical burden that would warrant serious consideration in sentencing.  Although I certainly can't fault counsel for pointing to SBF's positive characteristics, I'm sure Judge Kaplan knows that many of his opportunities to legibly display these characteristics have been enabled by privilege that most people being sentenced in federal court do not have. I'm also not generally convinced by the arguments about general deterrence. In abbreviated form, the argument is that running SBF through the ringer and exposing him to public disgrace is strong enough that a lower sentence (and the inevitable lifetime public stigma) suffices to deter other would-be fraudsters. See pp. 66-67. And there's good evidence that severity of punishment is relatively less important in deterrence.  However, if a tough sentence is otherwise just, I don't think we need a high probability of deterrent effect for an extremely serious offense for extended incarceration to be worth it. Crypto scams are common, and as a practical matter it is difficult to increase certainty and speed of punishment because so much of the problematic conduct happens outside the U.S. So severity is the lever the government has. Moreover, discounts for offenders who have a lot to lose (because they are wealthy already) and/or are seen as having more future productive value seem backward as far as moral desert.  Finally, I think there's potentially value in severity deterrence of someone already committing fraud; if the punishment level is basically maxed out at the $500M customer money you've already put at risk, there is no reason (other than an increased risk of detection) not to put $5B at risk. As the saying goes, "might as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb" as the penalty for ovine theft was death either way. Defense recommendations on sentencing are generally unrealistic in cases without specific types of plea deal. This one is no different. Also, the sentencing discussion will sound extremely harsh to at least non-US readers . . . but that's the situation in the US and especially in the federal system. I'd note that SBF's post-arrest decisions will likely have triggered a substantial portion of his sentence. Much has been written about the US "trial penalty," and it is often a problem. However, I don't think a discount of ~25-33% for a prompt guilty plea, as implied by the Guidelines for most offenses (also by the guidelines used in England and Wales) is penologically unjustified or coercive. Instead of that, SBF's sentence is likely to be higher because of multiple attempts at witness tampering and evasive, incredible testimony on the stand. So he could be looking at ~double the sentence he would be facing if he had pled guilty.  He likely could not have gotten the kind of credit for cooperation his co-conspirators received (a "5K.1") because there was no other big fish to rat out. Providing 5K.1 cooperation often reduces sentences by a lot, in my opinion often too much. Given the 5K.1 cooperation and the lesser role, one must exercise caution in using co-conspirator sentences to estimate what SBF would have received if he had promptly accepted responsibility. Finally, I'd view any sentence over ~60 years as de facto life and chosen more for symbolic purposes than to actually increase punishment. Currently, one can receive a ~15% discount for decent behavior in prison, and can potentially serve ~25-33% of the sentence in a halfway house or the like for participating in programs under the First Step Act. It's hard to predict what the next few decades will bring as far as sentencing policy, but the recent trend has been toward expanding the possibilities for early release. So I'd estimate that SBF will actually serve ~75% of his sentence, and probably some portion of it outside of a prison.

If anyone wants to see what making EA enormous might look like, check out Rutger Bregmans' School for Moral Ambition (SMA).  It isn't an EA project (and his accompanying book has a chapter on EA that is quite critical), but the inspiration is clear and I'm sure there will be things we can learn from it.  For their pilot, they're launching in the Netherlands, but it's already pretty huge, and they have plans to launch in the UK and the US next year.  To give you an idea of size, despite the official launch being only yesterday, their growth on LinkedIn is significant. For the 90 days preceding the launch date, they added 13,800 followers (their total is now 16,300). The two EA orgs with the biggest LinkedIn presence I know of are 80k and GWWC. In the same period, 80k gained 1,200 followers (their total is now 18,400), and GWWC gained 700 (their total is now 8,100).[1] And it's not like SMA has been spamming the post button. They only posted 4 times. The growth in followers comes from media coverage and the founding team posting about it on their personal LinkedIn pages (Bregman has over 200k followers).  1. ^ EA Netherlands gained 137, giving us a total of 2900 - wooo!